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CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT AND THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT'S
ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS:
A FAMILIAR PATH WITH SOME NEW DETOURS
THOMAS

L.

HAZEN *

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Supreme Court has limited' greatly the once feared
spectre of S.E.C. rule 10b-5 2 as an enforcement weapon in the hands of private parties. Once both hailed and assailed as the seed of a developing federal
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, B,A. 1969, J.D. 1972 Columbia
University: member of the Nebraska and New York bars. This article is a significant
expansion of a presentation delivered at the ALI-ABA Postgraduate Course in Securities Regulation in Madison, Wisconsin, June 29, 1979.
' Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
The rule was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a el. seq. (1976) which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange***
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
Although there is no express remedy, courts have long recognized an implied
private right of action. E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del.
819
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corporate law, 3 the scope of rule 10b-5 has been cut back significantly by
these decisions. First, implied private actions under rule 10b-5 have been limited to conduct involving scienter, thus clearly eliminating this federal remedy as a basis for challenging negligent mismanagement.' Second, the private damage plaintiff must have been a purchaser or seller of securities.'
And, third, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green,' such purchase or sale and resultant injury must have been induced by the defendant's deception of the plaintiff ? or have arisen as a result
of market manipulation. 8
This article will review the effects of the Supreme Court's limiting decisions. Particular attention will be given to the Santa Fe decision, which has
been interpreted by some courts as a relatively minor limitation," and by
others as a more substantial stumbling block to private suits." The article

1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See generally
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD—SEC RULE: 10b-5 (1977); L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION cbs. 6C, 9C (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
3 E.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Cox, Fraud is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule 106-5's Applications to Acts
of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 674 (1972); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. Rev. 1146 (1965); _Jacobs, The Role of Securities
Exchange Act Rule 106-5 in the Regulation trf Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. Rev.
27 (1973).
See, Block & Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and Breach of Fiduciary
Duty After Santa Fe v. Green, 2 CORP. L. Rev. 91 (1979); Hazen, Corporate Chartering and

the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 WISC. L. REV. 391, 413-27; Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects lOb-5's Proscriptions
Against Corporate Mismanagement, 6 SEC. Rec. L.J. 3 (1978); ,Jacobs, Rule 106-5 and Self
Dealing by Corporate Fiduciaries: An Analysis, 48 U. CIN. L. Rev. 643 (1979); Sherrard,
Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WAsn. &
LEE L. Rev. 695 (1978); Campbell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. V. Green: An Analysis Two
Years Later, 30 MAINE L. REV. 187 (1979); Note, Suits jiff Breach of Fiduciary Duties Under
Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. Rev. 1874 (1978).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
7 Id. at 474. Some appellate decisions have purported to minimize the deception requirement. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). The Goldberg court held that the deception requirement
is satisfied at the pleading stage if the plaintiff alleges either that full disclosure could
have given rise to an injunction under state law or that rather than airing its dirty
linen, the offending management might have refrained from the conduct complained
of. Id. at 220-21. However, other courts have not gone nearly as far. See, e.g., Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 106-111
5

fi

infra.
430 U.S. at 474. Manipulation as used in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
is a "term of art" limited to certain types of market conduct that are designed to
artificially affect the price. Id. at 476; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelcler, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976).
9 E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1978).
" E.g., Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
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initially will explore the limits placed on the application of rule lOb-5 to corporate mismanagement actions. The discussion will focus on the impact of the
Santa Fe decision" and on two other decisions limiting the applicability of
rule 10b-5." The discussion then will focus on alternative federal remedies
that may be used to compensate for the limitations imposed on rule 10b-5
damage actions. These complementary remedies are available under the general antifraud provision of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933," the
proxy machinery of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange
Act," the antifraud provision applying to the federal regulation of tender
offers of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act" and the antifraud
provision of section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act." The article will
continue by examining the proper role of the SEC in attempting to control
corporate mismanagement., especially in light of the restrictions imposed on
private litigants by Santa Fe, and the article will conclude by considering the
possible effects the proposed Federal Securities Code will have on the problem of corporate mismanagement. It will be submitted that the proposed Federal Securities Code, if enacted, will not work to clarify the ambiguities existing with regard to private remedies for corporate mismanagement, and the
resolution of the proper role for private remedies under rule 10b-5 will be
left to the courts. The limitations imposed by the Supreme Court, therefore,
will remain applicable to curtail the use of a rule 101)-5 remedy.

" It goes without saying that Santa Fe, like its two predecessors in the Supreme Court, may have significant impact upon SEC enforcement actions. However,
this issue goes beyond the scope of the instant discussion. For a discussion of this issue,
see generally, Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5
Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.C. L. REV. 769 (1976);
Lowenkls, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5: A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAw. 789 (1978); Maher & Blasi, Lessons from
Ernst & Ernst—Enforcement Proceedings and the Uncommon Law of Rule 10b-5, 82 Dick. L.
REV. I (1977); Note, Scienter and Injunctive Relief Under Rule 10b-5, 11 GA, REv. 879
(1977); Note, SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:
The Scienter Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 831 (1977); Note, New Light on an Old Debate:
Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 759 (1977).
The Supreme Court. is about to decide the issue of whether scienter must be proved in
SEC injunctive actions in SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co., iI979 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,800 (2d Cir. March 12, 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3253 (Oct.
15, 1979).
Similarly, this article will not deal with 10h-5 as it applies to insider trading. For a
discussion of that issue, see generally. W. PAINTER, FEDERAL. REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING (1968); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Loon, 93 HARV. L. RF.v. 322 (1979); Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate
Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. L. REV.
809 (1968); Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55.
" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Ernst. &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a) et. seq., § 77q(a). (1976).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1976).
" l5 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
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It is the author's position that a proper interpretation of the rule announced by the Court in Santa Fe will not sound the death knell for private
remedies under rule 106-5. Santa Fe, if properly interpreted, stands for the
proposition that a federal remedy can exist, that the deception requirement of
rule 10b-5 is fulfilled where the corporate management fails to disclose information required to be disclosed by state as well as federal law. The federal
remedy under rule 10b-5 should be barred only in instances where state or
federal law does not require disclosure of the information at issue. If the
Santa Fe decision is not interpreted properly, and if federal courts are precluded from enforcing disclosures required by state law, alternatives to rule
10b-5 will have to be explored to supplement the newly restricted rule 106-5
action. In this way, private parties may yet be afforded meaningful federal
recourse in appropriate cases for corporate mismanagement.
II. THE LIMITATIONS ON RULE 10b-5 PRIVATE ACTIONS
A. The Stage is Set: Mismanagement Cases Prior to Santa Fe
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe many lower courts had
imposed liability under rule 106-5, despite the absence of a causal misstatement or material omisson made in connection with the plaintiff's purchase of
securities. Since the Santa Fe decision may have been a reaction to what the
Court felt was an undue expansion of rule 10b-5 by the lower courts in imposing liability in these instances," it is necessary to examine some selected
earlier deception and mismanagement cases to fully understand the impact of
the Santa Fe decision.
In Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.," the Second Circuit was confronted with
a situation in which the defendant directors, who were in control of the
board, had withheld information from an outside director.'" The court sustained the rule 10b-5 claim and held that even though the outside director
could not have blocked the board's action, his deception could be imputed to
the corporation. 2 ° A short time later, the Second Circuit in O'Neill v.
Maytag 21 seemingly rejected the broad dicta that appeared in the Ruckle decision. In O'Neill the court held that where all of the directors were fully informed and no shareholder action was necessary to approve the action of the
board the corporation had not been deceived, and no rule 10b-5 action
existed."
In 1968, the Third Circuit was willing to take a broader view of rule
10b-5, just four years after the Second Circuit decision in O'Neill. In Pappas v.
Moss," the directors authorized the issuance of stock to themselves at a dis-

See note 3, supra.
339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
18 Id. at 25-26.
20 Id. at 28-29.
21 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
22
at 768.
23 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968). But see, e.g., Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872
(5th Cir. 1970), where the director induced the corporation to issue securities to the
17
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count. 24 The authorizing resolution contained material misstatements of fact
and, although each of the decisionmakers had been fully informed, the court
held that misleading the shareholders was sufficient deception of the injured
corporation. 25 While no shareholder action was required 26 CO approve the
directors' issuance of stock, it is possible that the Pappas court was concerned
with providing the shareholders with sufficient information to enable them to
redress the issuance of shares by obtaining an injunction in state court.'
The leading decision in the pre Santa Fe line of cases, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 28 was handed down by the Second Circuit in the same year as Pappas v. Moss. In Schoenbaum the defendants, exercising control over a partially
owned subsidiary in which the plaintiff was a shareholder, caused the subsidiary to issue additional shares to the defendants at a deflated price. 29 The
Second Circuit altered its earlier position in O'Neill and held that the plaintiffs
stated a rule 10b-5 cause of action where they were able to point to material
misstatements concerning the value of the subsidiary's shares. 3 ° In essence,
the court ruled that deception of the decisionmakers is not a prerequisite to a
rule 10b-5 claim if the plaintiff can show that a controlling shareholder, who
was benefitted by the transaction, dominated the board. 3 '
The Schoenbaum rule was elucidated further in Shell v. Hensley 32 by the
Fifth Circuit, which had previously taken a narrower view of rule 10b-5's deception requirement. 33 Shell involved allegations of misstatements in the
-

president at a deflated price. There were subsequent misstatements to the shareholders but not to decision-makers. The court denied the existence of a 10b-5 claim although there were causes of action under state law. 425 F.2d at 881.
24 393 F.2d at 866.
25 Id. at 869.
26 Id. Under the Model Business Corporations Act, once the shares have been
authorized by the shareholders, their issuance is up to the board of directors. ABAALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 16-19. The Model Act also provides: "In the absence
of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the board of directors or the shareholders, as the case may be, as to the value of the consideration received for shares shall
be conclusive." Id. § 19.
27 Presumably, had there been full disclosure, the shareholders could have
sought and secured an injunction under state law. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
28 405 F.2d 215 (2c1 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
2
Id. at 217-18.
3 ° Id. at 219. See generally, Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 U. VA.
L. Rev. 755, 806-11 (1970); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 106-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007 (1973); Comment, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, the 'New Fraud' Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 U. VA. L. REV. 1 103
(1969).
31 This is analagous to the recognition of a duty under state law running from
the majority shareholder to the minority where the board's action is so dominated. See,
e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). Notwithstanding the
questionable presence of deception at least one court believes Schoenbaum survives
Santa Fe. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978). Not surprisingly this pronouncement came from the same circuit that decided
Schoenbaum and was reversed in Santa Fe.
32 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
33 See Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872 (5111 Cir. 1970) which is discussed in
note 23 supra.
"
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proxy materials concerning an employment contract. The plaintiff based his
claim, however, in terms of rule 10b-5 rather than on the proxy rules since
the president's employment contract being challenged did not require
shareholder approval." The court held that deception of the shareholders
was sufficient, even though they were not decisionmakers and thus not in a
position to affect the transactions at issue." In reaching this result, the court
utilized the "controlling influence" test of Schoenbaum. The Fifth Circuit
stated:
when the other party to the securities transaction controls the judgment of all the corporation's board members or conspires with them
or the one controlling them to profit. mutually at the expense of the
corporation ... the corporation's choice of action ... is not made as
a reasonable man would make it possessed of all the material information known to the other party to the transaction."
The Shell court determined, therefore that the plaintiff alleged an actionable
claim of deception.
The next significant development in the area of corporate mismanagement was rule 10b-5's high watermark case: Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co. 37 Defendants, the management of an insurance company,
caused the company to part with its assets consisting of securities." Although
the defendants' activities had been characterized as pure mismanagement, and
nothing more than theft or embezzlement, the Supreme Court upheld the
rule 10b-5 claim on the grounds that there was fraud touching the sale of
securities.'" The Court found the required deception by the management
describing this as a case where the "seller was duped into believing that it ...
would receive the proceeds."'" Since the corporation was deceived, the Court
determined that a sufficient basis existed for a rule 10b-5 claim.
The Bankers Life decision not only set the stage for the Supreme Court's
recent restrictions on rule 10b-5 actions,'" it also temporarily gave a green
light to the lower courts for further expansion of the availability of rule 10b-5
to redress corporate mismanagement. For example, in Drachman v. Harvey ,42
Id. at 822-824.
430 F.2d at 827.
3° Id. It has been suggested that this "analogy" to deception "is not totally
convincing" and that since it "is grounded essentially in a breach of fiduciary responsibility, the test appears to have been overruled ... in Santa Fe." Sherrard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
695, 701, 702 (1978).
37 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
3 " Id. at 7-8.
39 Id. at 12 n.10.
34

3"

Id. at 9.
See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. J. 891 (1977).
" 453 F.2d 722, rev'd on rehearing, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en bane).
Another significant pre-Santa Fe decision was handed down in Bailey v. Meister Brau,
4°
41

Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976), where the plaintiffs, minority shareholders, complained of the sale of the corporation's assets in exchange for the stock of the acquiring company. The complaint alleged that the exchange was at an unfair ratio and
furthermore that, as pail of the deal, the target company's controlling shareholders
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the Second Circuit implicitly applied rule 101)-5's "new fraud" principles to
find an actionable violation under the "controlling influence" doctrine." In
Drachman, the defendants sold a portion of their controlling shares in a corporation at a premium, and then caused the corporation to redeem convertible
debentures pursuant to the defendants' plan to perpetuate their control."
Citing Schoenbaum and Bankers Life the court found actionable deception, despite the fact that the plaintiffs were not in a position to prevent this course of
action. 45 The court, in essence, concluded that. the majority shareholders
exercised the requisite deception by virtue of their domination of the board
and failure to disclose the true intent of their dealings. 4 "
The cases decided prior to Santa Fe demonstrate an expansion in the
scope of the rule 10b-5 remedy available to injured investors. The development in Schoenbaum and the continuation in Shell and Drachman of a policy
that recognized requisite deception of a corporation in instances where certain
shareholders exercised a controlling influence over the corporation, was a significant step in providing shareholders with a remedy for corporate mismanagement. No longer did the investor face the hurdle of showing actual
deception of a decisionmaker through misstatement or omission by the management. As the Supreme Court stated in Bankers Life, deception of the corporation could be found in the failure to publicly disclose material information.
B. The Santa Fe Decision
The trend in the earlier cases toward expanding the availability of the
rule 10b-5 remedy to private claimants was brought. to a halt by the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.'" In Santa Fe, the Court
determined that the federal securities regulation should be interpreted with a
view toward deference for state legislation regulating corporate action. The
Court found that in Santa Fe the defendant had disclosed all information required to be disclosed by Delaware law, and that policy reasons of deference
to the state control in this area precluded the Court from expanding the
scope of information required to be disclosed. The element of deception required for a rule 10b-5 action did not exist and therefore, the plaintiff's action failed.
The defendant in Santa Fe, Santa Fe Industries, owned a ninety-five percent controlling interest in Kirby Lumber, a Delaware corporation in which
the plaintiff was a minority stockholder." In order to convert its holdings
were to receive a premium for their shares. Id. at 985. The court held that nondisclosure of the controlling shareholders' conflict of interest when considering the sale of
assets constituted sufficient. deception under lob-5. Id. at 994. For a post-Santa Fe
analog to Bailey, see Wright v. Heizer Co„ 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434
U.S. 1066 (1978), discussed in the text accompanying notes 77-87 infra.
43 453 F.2d at 737.
44 Id. at 724-25.
45 Id. at 737-38.
4" Id. at 736-37.
47 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 465.
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into complete control, the parent corporation decided to utilize the Delaware
"short form" merger statute.'" Under the terms of the Delaware procedure,
a 90% majority can force the minority into a "cash out" merger, provided that
the minority receives notice of dissenting shareholders' appraisal rights within
ten days of the effective date." Pursuant to the terms of the merger, the
Kirby shareholders were to receive one hundred and fifty dollars per
share. 5 ' The defendant complied with the merger statute, and the minority
interests were given the ten days advance notice of their right to dissent, as
well as notice of an investment banking firm's valuation of one hundred and
twenty-five dollars per share."
After the consummation of the merger, the plaintiffs brought suit under
rule 10b-5, alleging that the proper valuation should have been based on a
going concern value of seven hundred and seventy-two dollars per share. 53
The plaintiff's theory was based on two types of alleged rule 10b-5 violations.
First, the plaintiffs claimed that the lack of a valid business purpose and the
absence of prior notice of this fact to the minority was a material nondisclosure. 54 • Second, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendant's appraisal
and offer were so grossly undervalued as to amount to fraud."

49 DEC. CODE

tit.

8, § 253 (Supp. 1978).

5°

Id. § 262.

51

430 U.S. at 466.

52
53

Id.

Id. at 467.

54 Id. at 467-68. The claim that the minority has been unfairly frozen out has
been used as the basis of recovery in both federal and state courts. See, e.g., Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 881 (1976)
(allowing a 10b-5 remedy for freezing out the minority); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (upholding a 10h-5
market manipulation claim in connection with a statutory merger); Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (striking
down a freeze-out merger under both state law and rule 10b-5 for the lack of a valid
business purpose). Cf. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)
(finding violations of the proxy rules with respect to a going-private merger but refusing to issue an injunction due to the absence of a "reasonable likelihood of recurrence"). But see Poiin v. Conduction Corp., 552 F.2d 797 (8th cir. 1977), cert. denied.
434 U.S. 857 (1978) (finding a valid purpose to support a going-private merger).
The debate over the existence of such a shareholder remedy has not been limited
to rule 10h-5 but has taken place in the state courts as well. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942) (awarding
damages under a state law claim attacking a freeze-out effected by a voluntary dissolution); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (upholding complaint against
a merger whose sole purpose was allegedly to freeze out the minority); Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (denying preliminary injunction); David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. 1971)
(denying preliminary injunction); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187
A.2d 78 (1962) (limiting the dissenter to the statutory appraisal remedy); Gabhart v.
Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977) (refusing to limit the shareholder's
remedy to statutory appraisal where there was no showing of legitimate corporate
purpose); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84
(1975), of 'g 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1975) (enjoining merger on the
grounds of unfairness in freezing out the minority); Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel,
Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1952) (holding the statutory appraisal right to be
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The district court dismissed the complaint reasoning that rule 10b-5 did
not override the express terms of the Delaware statute that permitted the
transaction at issue.66 The court went on to note that although the defendant's valuations were low, absent nondisclosure or misstatements to the appraiser, they did not amount to fraud." On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court dismissal. The appeals court stated:
We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule 10b-5 when it
charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form merger, that the
majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with minority shareholders by effecting the merger without any justifiable business purpose. The minority shareholders are given no
prior notice of the merger, thus having no opportunity to apply for
injunctive relief and the proposed price to be paid is substantially
lower than the appraised value.... We do not hold that the charge
of excessively low valuation by itself satisfies the requirements of
Rule 10b-5 because that is not the case before us."
This holding necessarily portended an expansive federal remedy for
mismanagement, but its days were short lived since the decision was reversed
by the Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court began its analysis by looking to the terms of rule
10b-5's authorizing statute, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 60 The Court pointed out that the statute requires "manipulative or
deceptive" conduct." Any reliance on the manipulation requirement was
quickly ruled out by the Court based on the Santa Fe facts." As for deception, the Court note that the earlier mismanagement cases upon which the
plaintiff relied, all involved material misstatements or omissions that deceived

plaintiff's exclusive remedy). See generally Borden, Going Private—Old Tort, New Tort or
No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV, L. REV. 297 (1974); Brudney & Chireistein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L. J. 1354 (1978); Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out
Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. Rev. 487 (1976); Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699 (1975); Rothschild, Going
Private, Singer and Rule 13e-3: What Are The Standards for Fiduciaries, 7 SEC REG. L.J.
195 (1979). Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964).
55 430 U.S. 467-68.
" 391 F. Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
57 Id. at 855.
58 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,
533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), on remand, 441 F. Supp. 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (complaint dismissed in light of Santa Fe); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). For the
appeal on remand, see 551 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1977) (dismissing the suit).
5" 430 U.S. at 471.
" 15. U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), set out in full at note 2 supra.
61 430 U.S. at 473. The Court stated, "The language of section 10(b) gives no
indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception." Id.
62 Id. at 476-77; see note 8 supra.
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investors in connection with the transaction in question." The Court found
that no such facts were alleged in the complaint before the Court. Santa Fe
had complied with the Delaware statute and disclosed all required information
to both the minority and the independent appraiser." Since Santa Fe had
disclosed all the information it was required to disclose, there was no valid
basis for a claim of deception. Thus, by the terms of the Act itself, the complaint was deficient on its face."
A second aspect of the Santa Fe decision departs from a literal reading of
the statute and looks to broader-based policy considerations. The Court noted
that utilizing rule 10b-5 to scrutinize the fairness of the underlying transaction
is "at best a subsidiary purpose" of the federal securities laws, and that, in any
event, to extend the rule 10b-5 private remedy would be inconsistent with the
Court's general approach to implied remedies." The substantive effect of
recognizing the Santa Fe plaintiff's rule 10b-5 claim would have been an incursion upon the province of state corporate chartering statutes regulating
corporate conduct."' The Court was particularly concerned with such state/
federal tensions since, at the time of the Santa Fe decision, Delaware, unlike
some other states, did not require a valid business purpose for short form
mergers and other freeze-out tactics." 8 The Court therefore determined that
"" Id. at 475 n.,15. See, e.g., Sup't of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972).
" 4 430 U.S. at 474. The Court stated,
On the basis of the information provided, minority shareholders could
either accept the price offered or reject it and seek an appraisal in the
Delaware Court of Chancery. Their choice was fairly presented, and they
were furnished with all relevant information on which to base their decision.
Id.

"' One question that remains, however, is whether the deception issue is of wide
ranging significance or merely a pleading problem. The proper answer lies somewhere
in the middle.
"8 430 U.S. at 478, citing, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also Cannon v.
Univ. of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 99 S. Ct.
2479 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. I (1977).
"7 430 U.S. at 479. The Court also stated,
There may well he a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in the complaint. But those standards
should not be supplied by judicial extensions of 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
"cover the corporate universe."
Id. at 480, quoting. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974).
430 U.S. at 479 n.16. Sec note 54, supra. Delaware has since recognized such
a remedy under its state law. See Majjar v. Roland International Corp., 387 A.2d 709
(Del. Ch. Ct. 1978); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Ch. 1978); Kemp v. Angel,
381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1977); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del.
Super. Ct.. 1978); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977);
'Panzer v. International Gen'l Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977). See
generally text accompanying note 70 infra. Hence, Santa Fe might well come out differently today. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2c1 Cir. 1977); cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See also Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 463 F. Stipp.
740 (W.D. Pa. 1979) rev'd on other grounds [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 97,268
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policy considerations did not militate in favor of expanding the scope of required disclosures. The Court deferred to the Delaware law and reasserted
that deception is required in rule 10b-5 actions.
C. Rule 10b-5 In The Post-Santa Fe Era
As was to be expected, commentators were quick to predict that Santa Fe
would have a significant limiting effect upon the permissible parameters of
rule 10b-5 litigation within the sphere of corporate mismanagement." It also
was suggested that the burden was now upon the state judiciary to tighten up
corporate law standards of fiduciary responsibility. 70 Delaware, traditionally
the most pro—management jurisdiction," was quick to respond by recognizing
a cause of action for a minority freeze out that is unfair to the minority and
serves no valid business purpose." This reversal by the Delaware Supreme
Court indicates that Santa Fe on its facts might be decided differently today.
More importantly, and quite ironically, the expansion of shareholder rights
under state law may in turn result in an expansion of rule 10b-5 liability." It
is submitted that this result is not as anomalous as it might appear. Rather, it
is perfectly consistent with the desired dichotomy favored by the Santa Fe
Court between federal securities regulation and the corporate chartering
function that is presently left to the states."
The following section will examine the effect of the Santa Fe decision on
the interplay between state corporate law and federal securities regulation in
subsequent cases dealing with corporate mismanagement. In so doing, the discussion will review five circuit court cases which have interpreted liberally the

(3d Cir. 1980) (both holding that nondisclosure of facts that would give rise to an
injunction under state law is sufficient to satisfy rule 10h-5's deception requirement).
But see Biesenback v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978) and Section Ill infra.
69 Sec note 4 supra.
711 See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wisc. L. REv. 391, 416-17.
n See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.
J. 663 (1974); Murdock, Delaware: The Race to the Bottom—!s the End in Sight?, 9 Lo•.
CHI. L. J. 643 (1978); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
72 See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp„ 383 A.2d 278 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978),
and other cases cited in note 68 supra.
" See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978). See also note 64 supra.
74 While several commentators have urged the federal chartering of corporations, such proposals have made no headway in Congress. See Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation. 49 HARV. L. RE Y. 396 (1936); Gary, Federalism and Corporate Law; Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Cary, A Proposed Federal
Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAw. 1101 (1974); Fleisher, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Henning, Federal Corporate
Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL, L. REV. 915
(1972); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L. J. 71
(1972); Stevens, Uniform Corporation Laws Through Interstate Compacts and Federal Legislation, 34 !Amu. L. REv. 1063 (1936); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal,
61 GEO. L. J. 89 (1972).
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Court's decision in Santa Fe to impose a lenient deception requirement.'s This
discussion will be followed by an examination of other cases which have interpreted Santa Fe in a much more restrictive manner, and which have limited
severely the rule 10b-S remedy."
There have been five post-Santa Fe circuit court decisions that have presented an extremely liberal approach in defining the deception requirement
as enunciated by the Supreme Court. The first of these cases arose before the
Seventh Circuit in Wright v. Heizer Corp." In Wright, a minority shareholder
brought suit derivatively claiming rule 10b-5 violations in a series of transactions in which the defendant, a controlling shareholder, had caused the
corporation to issue shares and convertible bonds at less than full value."
The first three claims arose prior to the defendant's acquiring control and
had been approved by a disinterested majority of the board of directors."
The district court dismissed these three claims and that part of its decision
was not appealed." The circuit court discussed the three claims, however,
viewing them as pure self-dealing without any element of deception, since no
decisionmakers had been deceived.' Second, the appellate court concluded
that the requisite causation was not present, since the shareholders were not
in a position to have prevented the three transactions. 82 Hence, the Seventh
Circuit apparently would have affirmed the district. court's dismissal of the
first three claims had these been appealed.
The fourth transaction, initiated by the majority shareholder, required
authorization by the shareholders to issue additional shares, and this requirement triggered a duty of disclosure of all material facts." Since there were
omissions from the proxy statement directed toward authorizing additional
shares, and since the corporation parted with these shares at less than full
value, the court held that the failure to disclose was actionable." The fifth

75 Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa. [Current] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH)
97,268 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Alabama
Farm Bureau; Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. American Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,
606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979). Wright v. Heizer Corp. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
76 Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978); Valente v. Pepsi Co.,
Inc., 454 F. Stipp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
78 Id. at 242-43.

411

" Id.
"" Id. at 245.
8 ' Id. at 250.
"2 Id. The court stated:
7

If these shareholders would have been powerless to prevent the proposed
self dealing by the controlling shareholder even if they had possessed
knowledge of all the facts, the failure to disclose to them would presumably
be immaterial and reliance could not be shown.
Id. This type of causal approach to deception is well taken as it embodies the concept
that the deceptive conduct must have actively deceived the complaining party.
83 Id. at 247.
84 Id. at 247-48.
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transaction involved the directors' pledge of securities held by the corporation, a decision made by a board that was controlled by the defendant. 85 The
court concluded that since Delaware law required ratification by the shareholders, there was actionable nondisclosure. The Seventh Circuit stated,
"[w]hen an entire board of directors is controlled by a self-dealing director or
shareholder, the corporation can only be represented by the independent
shareholders, to whom full disclosure must be made."" In so ruling, the circuit court acknowledged that this rationale constituted a rejection of the black
letter corporate law maxim that "[w]here disinterested directors constituted a
majority ... disclosure to the board is sufficient." 67
In reaching its decision on the fourth and fifth claims the Wright court
may have applied incorrectly the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Santa Fe. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, despite the controlling
shareholders' ability to secure the necessary shareholder vote, the minority's
ability to seek an injunction in state court provided the necessary causation to
make the deception actionable." It is arguable that such a finding of causa85
86

Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 249. Compare the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Mal-

donado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed in the text at notes 128-31

infra.
" 560 F.2d at 249, See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41, which
provides:
No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more
of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association or entity in
which one or more of its directors arc directors or officers or are financially interested, shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest or because such director or directors are present at the
meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes,
approves or ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or their
votes are counted for such purposes, If:
(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the
board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the
contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose
without counting the votes or consents of such interested directors; or
(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to
the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such
contract or transaction by vote or written consent; or
(c) the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction.
88 560 F.2d at 250. A federal action would have been cognizable under the
proxy rules. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975). Since the Heizer Corporation was not a 1934 Act reporting company it was not
subject to the proscriptions tinder the proxy rules. Rule 14-9 is the 101)-5 counterpart
for the proxy machinery, however, by virtue of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, its application is limited to issuers who are subject to the Act's periodic
reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979). Section 12(g)(I) of the Act makes the reporting requirements applicable to issuers which
are
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tion may be inappropriate since, although touching the sale of a security, the
transaction complained of was essentially a matter of corporate goverance
which can be viewed as not having involved the federal securities issue of
deception of investors, or of the market in general. 89 Under the rule of
Santa Fe, on the other hand, a rule 10b-5 claim properly is cognizable in
Wright to the extent that the defendant's conduct had involved violations of
state law that would have been discoverable upon full disclosure. This state
law violation rationale was more fully developed by the court in Goldberg v.
Meridor," the second expansive circuit court reading of Santa Fe.
In evaluating the Goldberg decision it must be kept in mind that the case
was decided by the Second Circuit, which also had handed down the Schoenbaum decision, and which authored the opinion that was reversed in Santa Fe.
The consistent policy of these decisions indicate an interpretation by the Second Circuit in favor of maintaining private remedies under the rule 106-5. In
Goldberg, the defendant parent corporations controlled a subsidiary in which
plaintiff was a minority shareholder)" After a public offering of the subsidiary's common stock and convertible debentures, the defendants caused the
subsidiary to loan seven million dollars to its direct parent and to enter into
various contracts with the parent corporation on terms favorable to the defendants. 92 This action was followed by the issuance of the subsidiary's
shares to its direct parent corporation, which, in turn, was controlled by the
other defendant parent corporation, in exchange for the assets and liabilities
of the direct parent. 93 After the transactions were completed the direct parent was left with assets consisting solely of the stock in the subsidiary, and the
subsidiary had acquired all the assets and liabilities of the parent, including
the seven million dollar debt to itself.
The essence of the plaintiff's derivative rule 10b-5 claim was that the
defendants had caused the subsidiary to raise money for the benefit of its
controlling parents and for the subsequent exchange of assets, and that this
action constituted a fraud against the subsidiary." The defendant moved to
dismiss the claim for failure to allege deception or nondisclosure in the trans-

(A) Within one hunched and twenty days after the last day of its first
fiscal year ended after July I, 1964, on which the issuer has total assets
exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by seven hundred and fifty or more persons;
and
(B) within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of its first
fiscal year ended after two years from July 1, 1964, on which the issuer has
total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than
an exempted security) held of record by five hundred or more but less
than seven hundred and fifty persons.
15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1976).
s " See Hazen. supra note 68, at 422-25.
'10 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
" Id. at 211.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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actions; in response, the plaintiff pointed to the nondisclosure of the defendants' conflicts of interest as a sufficient basis to constitute deception." The
court held that the plaintiff stated a valid rule 10b-5 claim." The Second
Circuit pointed to Schoenbaum and to its progeny concerning the controlling
influence doctrine and asked whether they survived the Santa Fe decision."
The court found that Schoenbaum does survive Santa Fe as long as there is
misleading disclosure or nondisclosure in addition to "a controlling influence"
and "wholly inadequeate consideration."" Although the decisionmakers in
the instant case were not deceived, the court noted that public disclosure
might have shamed the subsidiary's directors into voting against the transactions with its parents. 99
The concept of utilizing disclosure to encourage the directors into different, more reasonable conduct is an echo of a pre-Santa Fe causation analysis
taken by the same court in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.'°° In Schlick the
Second Circuit stated:
The minority shareholders, aside, there are two other purposes
served by the disclosure requirements which make a strict causation
rule—whether under a 10(b) or a 14(a) claim—antithetical to it:
1. By disclosure the market will be informed so as to permit
well-based decisions about buying, selling and holding the securities
involved in the transaction....
2. By virtue of the disclosure either modification or reconsideration of the terms of the merger by those in control might be
effectuated.'"
Id. at 212.
" 6 Id. at 221.
" 7 Id. al 214-15.
"8 Id. at 217-19.
"" Id. at 218-19. The court stated:

In TSC: Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S. Ct.
2126, 2133, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), a case arising under Rule 14a-9, the
Court laid down the standard of materiality as "a showing of a substantial
likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder" or, putting the matter in another way, "a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information
made available." When, as in a derivative action, the deception is alleged to
have been practiced on the corporation, even though all the directors were
parties to it, the test must he whether the facts that were not disclosed or
were misleadingly disclosed to the shareholders "would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations" of reasonable and disinterested directors or created "a substantial likelihood" that such directors would have
considered the "total mix" of information available to have been "significantly altered."
In essence the Goldberg court is requiring that interested directors live up to the standard of a reasonable outside director—an issue that has generally been left to the
states in regulating corporate government.
Id.
1

"" 507 F.2ci 374 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
Id. at 384.

101
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This dirty linen rationale for upholding the complaint in Goldberg at best
treads a fine line with the state/federal tensions that concerned the Court in
Santa Fe. The alternative basis for the Second Circuit's decision, however, is
easier to reconcile with these Santa Fe concerns. The Goldberg court pointed
out that the unfair exchange would have been the basis for an injunction
under New York law, and that the plaintiffs were deceived into not seeking
such an injunction. 102 This factor was held not. only to satisfy Santa Fe's deception requirement, but also the concern of undue interference with transactions that are valid under state law. 103 In short, the Santa Fe defendants had
complied with state law while the Goldberg defendants did not. Thus, the
Goldberg plaintiff was on solid ground under the Santa Fe rule in attacking the
procedure of the transaction.
More recently in Kidwell v. Meikle,'" the third post-Santa Fe decision giving a liberal interpretation to the deception requirement, the Ninth Circuit
followed the lead of the Second and Seventh Circuits in Goldberg and Wright,
and recognized that the rule lOb-5 remedy still has a role to play in appropriate breach of fiduciary responsibility cases. In Kidwell, four defendant directors voted to transfer the assets of the Grand Targhee Resort, Incorporated to a "sister corporation" in which those directors had an ownership
interest. 105 The derivative plaintiff alleged that the transfer was too favorable
to the sister corporation.'" Since Grand Targhee was a not-for-profit membership corporation, no vote of the members was required to approve the sale of
corporate assets,'" and accordingly, in response to the rule 10b-5 claim
brought on the membership's behalf, the defendants maintained that the absence of deception of the decision-makers in connection with the reorganization precluded the private remedy. 108
With regard to the four interested directors, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the claim that Santa Fe requires deception of the decisionmakers." 3 In the
court's view it was sufficient that the nondisclosure of the conflict of interest
precluded the members from securing an injunction against the transfer. The
court stated,
[T]here is room for Rule 10b-5 liability after Santa Fe Industries even
when the only deceived parties are shareholders who are not entitled
to vote on the transaction in question, and even though there may be
a breach of fiduciary duty under state law. Indeed, under the
Goldberg rationale, it is precisely because there are state-law remedies
that a deception can be found."°

"2 567 F.2d at 219-20.
"3 Id. at 219-21.
104 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
"5 Id. at 1280-83.
Id. at. 1285.
D 7 Id. at 1282.

I"

1

108
109

597 F.2d at 1290-91.
Id. at 1292.

110

Id.
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The court went on to point out that under the requisite test of causation the
plaintiff could have no rule 10b-5 remedy "unless a minority shareholder
would have succeeded in getting permanent injunctive relief or damages in
excess of an appraisal remedy in the state law action." "' These considerations
acknowledge that Santa Fe did not sound the death knell for rule 10b-5 in
mismanagement cases. Indeed, the Kidwell opinion, like Wright and Goldberg,
stands as an example of striking the balance advocated between the federal
state law remedies.
Even more recently, the Fifth Circuit has followed suit in Alabama Farm
Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. American Fidelity Life Insurance Co. 112
In that case, the court ruled that it is not necessary to prove the success of the
state law action, but rather merely to make out a prima facie case. The cause of
action alleged in Alabama Farm Bureau arose out of a company stock repurchase plan at artificially inflated prices, thus resulting in personal benefit to
certain inside directors by allowing them to maintain their positions. The Fifth
Circuit decision thus bears a striking resemblance to the pre-Santa Fe decision
of Schoenbaum. The current count, therefore, gives five circuits with an expansive reading of rule 10b-5 in the wake of Santa Fe.
In considering the precedential effect of the foregoing decisions it is important to keep in mind the factual settings in which they arose. Wright,
Goldberg, Kidwell, Alabama Farm Bureau and Healey all involved actual or
the potential for self-dealing. It has been held, in contrast, that where there is
an independent board, the Santa Fe deception requirement will bar recovery
absent deception of the decisionmakers.'" For example, the unfairness or
inequity of a merger ratio or tender offer will not, standing alone, give rise to
a rule 10b-5 claiin. 14 Where a conflict of interest is disclosed to a disinterested board that approved the transaction, and where no shareholder action is required, the corporation has not been deceived notwithstanding nondisclosure to the shareholders.'" It also has been held that self-dealing by
the parent of a wholly-owned insurance subsidiary, with resulting injury to the
policyholders did not give rise to a rule 106-5 claim as there was no deception

'" Id. at 1294.
12 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Meyers v. Moodey, 475 F.
Supp. 232, 244-46 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Most recently the Third Circuit in Healey v.
Catalyst Recovery of Pa., (Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1l 97,268 (3d Cir. 1980),
expressly adopted the Goldberg state court injunction rationale. In Healey prior to the
consumation of a merger, the defendants refused to show the plaintiffs certain requested information which they claimed would have provided the basis for a state
court injunction against the merger. See notes 132-37 infra and accompanying text.
1 " See Tyco Labs. Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Stipp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977); See also
Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Stipp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in port & rev'd in port,
597 F.2d 789 (2(1 Cir. 109); Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. D.A.S.A.
Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
14 Halle & Stieglitz, Filor, Bullard, Inc. v. Ingress International, Ltd., 442 F.
Stipp. 217 (D. Del. 1977), Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
15 Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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of the corporation within the meaning of Santa Fe." 6 In that case the court
also noted that the policyholders were not injured in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security."' It thus appears that the liberal interpretation of the deception requirement may be limited to those instances involving self-dealing by interested directors. It is interesting to note, in this
regard, the pre-Santa Fe decisions employed a similar test in upholding corporate mismanagement actions.' 1 A
In contrast to Wright, Goldberg, Kidwell, Albama Farm Bureau and Healey,
the Third Circuit in Biesenbach v. Guenther "9 interpreted Santa Fe as a much
more significant limitation on private actions under rule 10b-5. In Biesenhach,
the defendants constituted a majority of the directors of Heidelberg, Inc. and
entered into two loan transactions.' 20 In the first transaction the defendants
loaned $500,000 to the corporation, secured by a second lien on assets; they
were to receive a 10% interest rate which, over the minority's objection, was
raised to 4% above the prime rate.' 2 ' The second loan of more than
$226,000 had a 15% interest rate.'" The defendants also decreased the size
of the board to tighten their control and authorized issuance of an additional
million shares, notwithstanding their stated intent to issue only half that
much.' 23
In affirming dismissal of the complaint, the Biesenbach court ruled that
cognizance of a rule 10b-5 claim, based solely on nondisclosure of breaches of
fiduciary duties "would clearly circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in
Santa Fe. " 124 T his rationale is in direct conflict with the Second Circuit's approach in Goldberg, which premised the rule 10b-5 violation upon the underlying state law. The Biesenbach approach is also, unlike the Goldberg approach,
not in the best interest of investor protection. The Goldberg view furthers investor protection without unduly infringing upon the corporate chartering
function. Unlike the factual setting in Santa Fe, recognition of a federal remedy under rule 10b-5, in Biesenhach would not undercut the state chartering
scheme. To the contrary, the force of the law of the chartering jurisdiction is
significantly strengthened by the supplemental federal remedy. Investors have

" 9 Superintendent of' Ins. v. Freedman, 443 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In
Falkenherg v. Baldwin [1977-78 Transfer Binder) Fro. Su:. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 96,086
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1977), the nondisclosure of certain corporate liabilities allegedly
inflated the price of the stock repurchaced by the corporation. The court dismissed
the complaint since all of the officers and directors had knowledge of the liabilities.
The court imputed their knowledge to the corporation and hence concluded that the
corporation had riot been deceived. Id. See also Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. 555
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
117 Id. at 637,
119 See lext at notes 26-34 supra.
I " 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
1211 Id. at 401.
Id.
Id.
123 Id.
121
122

124 Id. at 402. For another case denying a 10b-5 claim on similar facts, ,tee
Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), discussed in the text at note
115 514Pra.
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an interest in—and an honest trading market demands—full disclosure of
adverse information that could affect the market price. Disclosure of facts that
would reveal possible violations of state law will enable prevention of improper transactions rather than forcing an after-the-fact challenge to the
transaction which, if successful, will necessarily result in disruption of the
normal market forces governing securities trading. 125 Examination of
selected additional post-Santa Fe decisions will point further to the correctness
of the approach taken by Goldberg and its progeny.
A 1978 Southern District of New York decision underscores the complementary effect of recognizing the federal rule 10b-5 remedy where there
has been a violation of state law. In Valente v. Pepsi Co., Inc.,' the defendants
embarked upon a tender offer which was to be followed by a merger.'" The
tender offeror did not mention the availability of appraisal rights under state
law as an alternative to the merger.'n The tender offeror also failed to state
that the target company's debentures had a redemption price higher than the
tender offer price.'" In addition, there was no mention of the improved
earnings of the target company.'" The district court upheld the rule 10h-5
claim, reasoning that these omissions were a sufficient deception to satisfy
Santa Fe. 131
While one could give Santa Fe a restrictive reading in order to rule that so
long as appraisal rights were available under state law, there is no federal rule
10b-5 claim, such a result in Valente would have ignored the necessary overlap
between federal and state regulation. The presence of appraisal rights that.
are designed to assure fairness is a question of state law, going to the nature
of the shareholders' proprietary interest. Full disclosure of all relevant information goes to their investment decision with respect to the securities in question. Within the one situation, therefore, there are aspects of both federal and
state regulatory interests. Although the presence of the appraisal rights standing alone, without a federally related investment decision issue, clearly would
involve only the application of state law, the presence of both aspects within

"5 For a more complete discussion of market impact, see, e.g., Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 Coi.um. L. REV.
388 (1977).
126 454 F. Stipp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
127 Id. at 1233.
128 Id. at 1239.
' 29 Id. at 1242.
"3" Id. at 1243.
171 Id. at 1254. Presumably, even the Third Circuit would agree with the court's
analysis in Valente since, in connection with their decision whether to tender their
shares, the plaintiff's were decisionmakers with respect. to 1.he transaction in question.
Furfuermore, their decision to tender can readily be seen as due to the deception
caused by the material nondisclosures. The nondisclosures could be equally deceptive
with respect. to the nontenclering shareholders but their 10b-5 claim would be barred
by the requirement that plaintiffs be either purchasers or sellers of securities. See Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). However, such a claim might
be cognizable under section 14(e)'s antifraud proscriptions for tender offers. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(c) (1976). See Piper v. Chris-Craft. Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in
the text at notes 223-25 infra.
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the situation militates in favor of recognizing complementary jurisdiction. In
this way both the federal and the state interests may be protected.
The narrow approach of Biesenbach has not been universally accepted by
all courts in the Third Circuit. In Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa.,'" the defendants, controlling shareholders who collectively owned eighty percent of
CRSI stock, utilized a statutory merger to freeze out the remaining 20 percent
shareholder at. a "grossly inadequate quid pro quo."'" The district court in
Pennsylvania sustained the jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor. 134 Although
the defendants' eighty percent was sufficient to assure the success of the
merger vote, the availability of an injunction in state court, had the' plaintiff
been fully informed, was sufficient to satisfy both rule 10b-5's deception and
causation requirements.' 35 The district court noted that rule 10b-5 can be
used in connection with a merger and the accompanying utilization of the
proxy machinery to ensure "that shareholder approval is fairly sought and
freely given."'" The Healey district court supported its decision by pointing to
the proper significance of the lesson to be learned from Santa Fe. The court
stated, "once there has been full disclosure ... the wisdom or fairness of the
transaction does not implicate federal law."'" In the case before it, however,
such disclosure was lacking and the federal remedy of rule 10b-5 was available
to supplement the state law. In Healey, as in Goldberg, Kidwell, Wright and
Alabama Farm Bureau, the court, therefore, was willing to adopt the approach
that rule 10b-5 can complement, and thus help preserve state law rights while
still fulfilling its proper objective of investor protection. Although adopting
the Goldberg rationale neither the district nor circuit court in Healey expressly rejected the earlier Biesenbach ruling.
The preceding discussion, however, should not be taken to indicate that
Santa Fe's deception requirement and concern over state/federal tensions have
no significant impact upon preventing the abuse of the rule 10b-5 remedy to
address mere corporate mismanagement. Two recent circuit court decisions
highlight this point. O'Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank '" is an excellent example of the necessity that the rule 10b-5 claim be tied to investor
protection and, more specifically, to the plaintiff's investment decision. In
O'Brien the defendant trustee had been given discretionary authority to
purchase and sell securities on behalf of the plaintiff pension trust funds." 9
The rule 1013-5 claim arose out of the defendant's purchase, for the plaintiff's

132 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,238 (3d Cir. 1980) reversing only on
the issue of materiality. 463 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Pa. 1979). See also ,Jacobs v. Hanson,
464 F. Supp. 777, 779, 784 (D. Del. 1979) (where misstatements concerning the sale of
the corporation's assets followed by liquidation were sufficient to state a 10b-5 claim
where a fully informed plaintiff might have been able to secure injunctive relief).
1 " 463 F. Supp. at 742.
134 Id. at 744-45.
Id. at 744.
138 Id. at 743, quoting from the pre -Santa Fe, Second Circuit decision in Popkin
v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1972).
137 463 F. Supp. at 743.
138 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979).
'38 Id. at 57.
' 32
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account, of securities of companies of which the defendant was a creditor.'"
The plaintiffs further claimed that had the conflict of interest been disclosed
they would have terminated the trust relationship with the defendant."' The
Seventh Circuit held that no rule 10b-5 action was stated,' 42 and gave two
bases for its ruling. First, the decision whether to terminate or to bring an
action with respect to the trust agreement was not within rule 10b-5's scope
since such termination is not a security transaction.'" Second, rule 10b-5 was
meant to assure the availability of full information to decisionmakers in securities transactions. Where one has entrusted those decisions to others,
breaches of fiduciary duties are left to state law.' 44
While the court in O'Brien could have stretched the facts to fit within the
rule 106-5 remedy; wisely it did not. The argument the court could have used
is that the plaintiff was an investor, and that its derivative purchase of the
securities in question was effectuated as a result of the defendant's nondisclosures. The problem with such an approach is that the plaintiff here was
one step removed from the marketplace as compared with Goldberg and
Healey. It follows that in attempting to be watchful for state/federal tensions,
this additional element of remoteness quite properly tips the scale and mitigates against recognition of rule 10b-5 claims.
The next illustrative case demonstrates that even the Second Circuit recognizes the proper limits of the rule 10b-5 private remedy. In Maldonado v.
Flynn 145 the plaintiffs alleged violations of rule 1 Ob-5 and section 14(a) with
regard to the administration of the stock option plan in a manner that benefitted certain senior officers.'" The court began its analysis by stating that
the requisite deception was missing in this instance."' Modification of the
plan by four disinterested directors precluded a rule 10b-5 claim; there was
no deception since no shareholder vote was required.'" Because this procedure complied with the state law, Santa Fe was directly on point and the
Goldberg decision was inapposite. The court then remanded the decision to
determine whether there were material misstatements, concluding that the absence of shareholder approval did not preclude a section 14(a), rule 14a-9
claim for material misstatements in connection with the utilization of the
proxy machinery.'"
1411

"I Id.
142
' 43
' 44

a

Id. at 60.
Id. at 63.

597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. 555
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the plaintiffs challenged alleged foreign and domestic bribes
made by the management of GTE Corp. Although the shareholders had not been
informed, knowledge of the entire board precluded a finding of the necessary deception. 465 F. Supp. at 565-66.
' 4 " 597 F.2d at 791.
147 Id. at 793.
148 Id. at 793-94. Compare the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Wright
v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978), discussed in the text at notes 77-87 supra.
'" 597 F.2d at 791. See also Weisberg v. Coastal State Gas Corp., [19791 Fun.
Sic. L. REP. (CC H) 11 97,168 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 1979).
145
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The Maldonado decision recognized that if the alleged improprieties arose
with respect to required disclosure, the federal private remedies have a valid
role to play. In subsequent years the proxy material concerning the election of
directors failed to disclose the true events surrounding the amendment to the
stock option plan. The Second Circuit determined that if the statements were
material, this nondisclosure was actionable under the proxy rules since it related to the directors' fitness in connection with their continued reelection by
the plaintiff shareholders."° This aspect of the Maldonado ruling is significant for two reasons. First, it correctly indicates that past violations of state law
can be a valid concern of the federal securities laws as well as the future
violations and the availability of prospective relief that were at issue in
Goldberg. Second, as developed more fully below,'" the proxy rules and their
correlative implied private right of action have an important role to play in
corporate mismanagement cases.
As was previously demonstrated, the Santa Fe decision does not sound the
death-knell for rule 10b-5 remedies in corporate mismanagement cases.
Nevertheless, it is now evident that plaintiffs cannot manufacture a federal
claim simply because they were injured by mismanagement that happened to
touch their purchase or sale of securities.'' In particular, the post Santa Fe
cases require that there be a substantial nexus between the injury, investor
protection and the securities markets. Such a reading of rule 10b-5 both preserves the Supreme Court's concerns in Santa Fe and the very important enforcement and compensatory mechanism provided by the rule 10b-5 private
damage action.
D. Some Additional Limiting Factors in Rule 10b-5 Mismanagement Actions
Having concluded that the courts should refrain from extending Santa Fe
to limit even further the efficacy of the rule 10b-5 private remedy, it is useful
to mention some other limiting factors, primarily concerning standing and
scienter, that combine to prevent undue expansion of the implied remedy,
while at the same time allowing meaningful relief in appropriate cases. The
limits these factors place on the rule I Ob-5 cause of action, in conjunction with
an overly zealous extension of Santa Fe, as in Biesenbach,' 53 demonstrate the
potential unfortunate threat to the continuing vitality of this private remedy.
These factors also illustrate the need to utilize complementary private remedies under the securities laws to provide a means of ensuring some continuing federal redress for corporate mismanagement. Since some of the restrictions of rule 10b-5 do not apply to these alternative remedies, such remedies
may provide a meaningful way to compensate for the rule 10b-5 limitations.
These alternatives will be explored later in this article.

15" 597 F.2d at 791. Not every aspect of managerial misconduct is material. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Valley. 476 F. Stipp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Amalgamated Clothing & Tex
tile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. J.P. Stevens Co., 475 F. Stipp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
151 See Section III-B, infra.
"2 But see, Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc. 434 F. Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1977).
153 588 F.2d 400 (3rd Cir. 1978).

July 1979]

CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT

841

In addition to the limits imposed by Santa Fe, there are two major judicially imposed restrictions on the availability of a rule 10b-5 remedy. The first
of these limits, the purchaser/seller limitation of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores 154 provides that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities may
avail themselves of the rule 10b-5 remedy.'" Offerees who are discouraged
from buying a security by fraudulent misrepresentation are not proper rule
10b-5 plaintiffs. 156 This limitation ensures that the rule 10b-5 remedy is limited to investors who are directly injured by fraud or nondisclosure in the
marketplace.'" The claims of defrauded offerees and offerors are inherently speculative; their injury does not impinge as directly on the securities
markets as injury done to actual purchasers and sellers. The claims of offerors
and offerees are best left to resolution by state law.
The second significant 10b-5 restriction is the requirement, imposed in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'" that the private damage plaintiff prove that the
defendant acted with scienter.'" This excludes from the rule 101)-5 private
remedy a significant area of corporate mismanagement: breaches of duties of
care based on merely negligent acts or omissions. Such acts and omissions do
not have the required substantial nexus between injury, investor protection
and the securities markets to warrant incursion into the state chartering function. The Hochfelder limitation serves the purpose of preserving the rule 106-5
action in the large area of intentional wrongdoing, while at the same time
ensuring that federal law does not wholly preempt the states in dealing with
mere mismanagement. The scienter requirement thus relegates merely negligent offenses to the state forums or to other provisions of the federal regulatory scheme.
The Hochfelder decision raises a number of unanswered questions that are
worth noting. To begin with, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of
whether reckless conduct can satisfy the scienter requirement or whether scienter is limited to the defendant who has acted intentionally. 16 o Nevertheless,

15 ' 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue Chip represented the unequivocal adoption of the
Second Circuit's Birnbaum rule which had been increasingly eroded and rejected over
time. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). See generally, Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls the
Knell of the Parting Day?" 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the
Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era For Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Note, Rule

106-5: The Rejection of the Birnbaum Doctrine by Eason a. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
and the Need for a New Limitation on Damages, 1974 DUKE L. J. 610.
421 U.S. at 730-31.
Id. at 754-55.
157 The reader may wish to contrast the respective differences between rule
106-5, the proxy rules, the Williams Act's regulation of tender offers, the Securities Act of 1933's general antifraud provision—section 17(a). See section III, infra.
1 " 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
's" Id. at 193.
I" 425 U.S. at 193-94 & 11.12. See e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F:2(1 1190,
1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (in certain cases reckless conduct will satisfy the scienter requirement); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) (recklessness will suffice).
155

I"
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the majority of lower courts that have dealt with the issue have opted in favor
of a recklessness threshold."'
A second issue raised by Hochfelder which bears upon corporate management norms is whether the scienter limitations apply to SEC enforcement
actions.' 62 A majority of courts have held that the limitation does not
apply.'" This conclusion conceivably could be extended to formulate an
argument that Santa Fe's deception requirement, on its facts, is also limited to
private damage actions. Such a reading of Santa Fe, however, would be too
literal and too narrow, and would ignore the import of the Santa Fe Court's
concerns. The importance of SEC enforcement actions should not be underestimated as a weapon against corporate mismanagement, especially in light of
the Commission's ability to secure ancillary relief.'" But, whereas the Commission probably should have the ability to enjoin negligent conduct, its power
should not extend to conduct that is not deceptive. Negligent deceptive con-

1 " 1 See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 99 S. Ct.
464 (1978); Rolf v. Bluth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 642 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 99 S. C:t. 106 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U,S. 875 (1977) (all holding that recklessness will suffice). See generally, Branson, Statutory Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 Tut.. L. REV. 50 (1977); Bucklo, The
Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 106-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29
STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977).
" 2 The Court expressly left this issue for future determination. 425 U.S. at
193-94 n.I2. However, such a determination should be forthcoming in the near future. See SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1196,800 (2d Cir. March 12, 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3253 (Oct. 15, 1979).
" 3 E.g., SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED, SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,80(1 (2d Cir. March 12, 1979), cert. granted 18 U.S.L.W. 3253 (Oct. 15,
1979); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1227 (1979); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535 (Ist Cir. 1976); SEC v. Universal Major Indus.
Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1978); SEC v. Spectrum
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Shiell [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED.
Sic. L. REP. (CCH) 96.190 (N.D. Fla. 1977); But see, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325
(5th Cir. 1978).
See generally Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
106-3 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769
(1976); Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b)
and Ride 106-5: A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LA w. 789 (1978); Maher & Blasi, Lessons
from Ernst & Ernst—Enforcement Proceedings and the Uncommon Law of 106-3, 82 Dicx. L.
REV. I (1977); Note, New Light on an Old Debate: Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud
Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 759 (1977); Note, Scienter and SEC Injunctive Actions Under Securities Act Section 17(a), 63 IowA L. REV. 1248 (1978); Note, Scienter and
Injunctive Relief Under Rule 106-3, 11 GA. L. REv. 879 (1977); Note, SEC Enforcement
Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 106-5: The Scienter Question, 5
HorsTRA L. REv. 831 (1977); Note, SEC Injunctive Actions: A Negligence Standard Under
Rule 106-5, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 763 (1977).
" 4 See generally Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Seciirities Fraud Actions Brought by the
SEC, 1977 DUKE L. J. 641; Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976); Note, SEC Injunctive and Ancillary Relief Under Rule 106-5:
A Scienter Requirement?, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 872.
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duct is still a proper concern of federal law to some extent. Conduct that does
not meet the Santa Fe deception requirement, on the other hand, relates to
problems of ordinary corporate governance which are best left to the states." 5
The factors discussed in this section combine with the deception requirement to define the appropriate parameters of the role of rule 10b-5 in regulating internal corporate matters. These factors combine to impose substantial limits on the availability of the rule 10b-5 remedy. The issue that remains
to be considered is the effect of other implied remedies that have been recognized under the federal securities laws and the desirability of extending or
limiting these remedies to provide proper recourse for wronged investors. It
will be shown that many of these alternative remedies quite properly can redress wrongs that formerly were redressed under rule 10b-5, and that several
of these alternatives ought to be developed to compensate for the limits
placed on rule 10b-5.
III. FEDERAL ALTERNATIVES TO RULE 10b-5 ACTIONS FOR
REDRESSING BREACHES OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The preceding material demonstrates that the Supreme Court in recent
years has curtailed drastically the applicability of rule 101)-5 to various types of
corporate mismanagement cases. Whereas some of this narrowing of the
scope of the private remedy is desirable, this trend threatens to go too far and
to eviscerate the ability of the federal courts to play a role in redressing
breaches or corporate fiduciary duties which impinge on the securities markets. It is desirable, therefore, to examine other sections of the securities laws
to see if they can fill the void left by the restriction of the rule 10b-5 action.
This article will now discuss four sections of the securities laws which have
played a secondary role in policing corporate mismanagement in the past:
first, section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933—the general antifraud provi-

"' Santa Fe's deception limitation is found in the express terms of section 10(b)
whereas Hochfelder's scienter requirement was derived by implication from the same
section; thus, Hochfelder leaves more room for interpretation and refinement in connection with enforcement actions. It is, therefore, possible that the scienter requirement does not apply to enfOrcement actions, while the deception limitation does. The
Commission, however, does not appear to acquiesce in this view. See section IV infra.
There are two other limitations on rule 10b-5's implied remedy that deserve mention.
These are: (I) that the omissions or misstatements be material; and (2) that there be a
sufficient causal link between the omissions or misstatements and the injury complained of. 17 C.F.R. 240. 10b-5. In the corporate deception cases, assuming that the
decisionmakers are fully informed, the causation requirement is not net where the
shareholders could not have taken any preventive steps. See, e.g., Wright v. Heiner
Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Altman v.
Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the
Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility, and Management Accountability, 1978 Wise. L. REV. 391, 418-27. Conversely, if the shareholders could have enjoined the transaction, there is sufficient causal link between the nondisclosure and the
alleged injury to permit recovery under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery
Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); _Jacobs v. Hanson, 464 F, Supp. 777 (D. Del. 1979);
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, 463 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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sion,'" second, section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 " 7 —
which prohibits fraud in connection with the solicitation of proxies and rule
14a-9 developed thereunder,'" third, section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act""—the antifraud provision in the tender offer area, and fourth,
section 18(a) of the 1934 Act ' 7 "—an antifraud provision explicitly giving a
private civil remedy. These alternative remedies will be examined to see how
they are, or are not, bound by the aforementioned limitations on the rule
10b-5 action—the purchaser/seller, scienter and deception requirements. This
section will discuss whether an expansion of private rights under these statutes is both possible and desirable in view of the Supreme Court's concern
with federal/state tensions. The limitations that are inherent in these remedies
will bring into focus the undesirability of further restriction of the rule 101)-5
remedy, and of blindly carrying over the restrictions to other federal remedies.
A. Section 17(a) of The Securities Act of 1933:
The General Antifraud Provision
When the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5, it patterned the rule on section
I7(a)'s general antifraud proscriptions.'" Although the Supreme Court has
not decided the question, the overwhelming majority of lower courts that have
considered the issue have recognized an implied private remedy under section
I7(a). 12 Since the Supreme Court's rule 10b-5 limitations are relatively recent the courts are just beginning to consider the potential of section 17(a) as
a meaningful alternative and supplement to rule 101)-5.
"" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). For a more extensive treatment of section 17(a)
remedies, see Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 105-5: Implied Remedies and
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641 (1978); Horton, Section
17(a) 4 the 1933 Securities Act—The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U. L. REV.
44 (1973); Comment, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act: An Alternative to the Recently
Restricted Rule 106-5, 9 RUT. CAM. L.J. 34(1 (1978).
" 7 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
" 8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a(9) (1979).
"" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
1741 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). In addition to these four general antifraud remedies, the more limited remedies of the Securities Act of 1933 deserve mention:
Section 11 of the 1933 Act gives an express private remedy to purchasers injured by
misstatements in connection with prospectuses required by § 5 of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
77k (1976). Similarly, section 12 provides two express remedies kir defrauded purchasers. Section 12(1) grants a cause of action to purchasers of securities sold in violation of § 5 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976)—the Act's registration requirement. 15
U.S.C. § 771 (I) (1976). Section 12(2) provides an express fraud remedy for even negligent misconduct but imposes a strict privity requirement. 15 U.S.C., 771(2) (1976).
In

See 1

A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD: SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2(410)

(1970).
12 See, e.g., Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct., 570 (1979): Newman v. Prior. 518 F.2d 97 (4th
Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co.. 479 F.2d 1277, 1280 11.2 (2d Cir. 1973): Smith v.
.Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Cook v. Avien, Inc.,
573 F.2d 685, 698 n.30 (1st Cir. 1978). But see, e.g„ Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail,
Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
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There are three significant differences between the 1933 Act section and
the 1934 Act rule. First, section 17(a) on its face applies to offers and sales,'"
while rule 10b-5 speaks in terms of a "purchase or sale." 174 It was this language in rule 10b-5 that led the Court in Blue Chip Stamps to adopt its standing limitation.' Section I7(a)'s different wording indicates that it has a different standing limitation. In fact, post-Blue Chip Stamps decisions have held
that an offeree who does not purchase the securities may maintain a private
damage action under section 17(a).'" The policies underlying the securities
laws as well as the implying of private remedies thereunder both favor such a
result.'" This rule necessarily enlarges the number of potential plaintiffs
and, if section 17(a) is applicable to corporate mismanagement cases, increases
the scope of the federal remedy to the extent that the plaintiff is either directly or derivatively an offeree of securities. While section 17(a) applies to
offerees, however, it would not appear to apply to sellers of securities. They,
of course, can rely on rule 10b-5. Therefore, instead of a purchaser/seller
limitation, section 17(a) has a purchaser/offeree limitation. Nevertheless, in its
application to offerees, section 17(a) can, perhaps, be used to fill a portion of
the gap in rule 101)-5 coverage created by Blue Chip Stamps.
The second divergence between the language of section 17(a) and rule
101)-5 allows for a similar expansion of the. 1933 Act remedy. Section I7(a),
unlike Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, does not contain the requirement.
that the proscribed conduct he manipulative or deceptive. Indeed, the Hochfelder Court observed that the text of rule 10b-5 itself does not appear to
mandate a scienter requirement.' 78 The scienter limitation was found implicit in rule f Ob-5 in order to bring it into conformity with section 10(b). 179
Since the language of section 17(a) is identical to that in rule 10b-5, it also
does not mandate a scienter requirement.'s 0 While a number of courts have
used this reasoning to find that there is no scienter requirement in SEC enforcement. actions under section 17(a),'" only one court has expressly
adopted this approach in private suits.' It goes without saying that such a
no-scienter rule, if accepted, would, like the more relaxed standing rule, be a
substantial boon to the private plaintiff in section 17(a) cases.

77q(a) (1976).
'" 15 U.S.C.
'" IS U.S.C.
77j(b) (1976).
' 7 ' 421 U.S. at 733-36.
176 See Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 610 n.12 (9th Cir.
1977) (dicta); Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Stipp. 332 (E.D.Va. 1977); Wulc v. Gulf &
Western Indus., Inc., 400 F. Stipp. 99 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
177 See Hazen, supra note 166, at 659-66.
'" 425 U.S. at 195-201.
179

Id.

'ao See. e.g., Nassar & Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 790, 793-94, (1).C. Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. REP. (CCH) 11
96,462 (2d Cir. June 2, 1978); SEC v. American Realty Trust Co., 586 F.2d 1001 (4th
Cir. 1978); Nassar & Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 790 (1).C. Cir. 1977); SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976).
' 12 Cam pito v. McManus, [Current] Fran. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 15 96,874 at
95.574-75 (N.D.N.Y. April 20. 1979) (indicating that this is the accepted rule of the
Second Circuit); contra, Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977);
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The third difference between section 17(a) and rule 10b-5 is that because
of differing jurisdictional provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, there is concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts for section 17(a) suits, while rule I Ob-5
claims remain exclusively federal.'" This is significant to the issue at hand in
light of the Santa Fe Court's concern over state/federal tensions.'" The duality
of jurisdictional approaches is a two-edged sword. On the one hand it could
he argued that the concurrent jurisdiction of section 17(a) would exacerbate
the tension since federal courts would be mandating state court rules in mismanagement cases. It then would follow that the concerns of Santa Fe would
be safeguarded by keeping the federal courts out of the section I7(a) arena
and by allowing the state courts to fashion their own section 17(a) mismanagement remedies, should they so desire. On the other hand, limiting the federal mismanagement remedy to rule 106-5 arguably would close the door to a
potentially helpful input from the states in terms of their section 17(a) jurisprudence. In view of the Court's concern for state input in regulating corporate management, this result would not be beneficial. These three considerations demonstrate, therefore, that section 17(a) could become a valuable tool
in compensating for the limitations placed on rule 10b-5 actions, while also
complying with the spirit of the rule in Santa Fe.
There are, however, two factors which militate against using section 17(a)
10 fill the gap left by the recent limitations imposed on the rule 10b-5 cause of
action. First, while section 17(a) has an important role to play as a private
remedy, its availability should be limited to the securities distribution process,
as distinct from rule 10b-5's broader trading concerns.'" The 1933 Act is
concerned solely with the securities distribution process, while the 1934 Act
deals with trading. Section 17(a) should not be expanded beyond the
parameters of the general design of which it is but a part.'"

Wiener v. Oppenheimer & Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1,1 96,764 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
1979); Malik v. Universal Resources, Corp., 425 F. Stipp. 350 (S.D. Cal. 1976). See
generally, Hazen, supra note I66 at 666-77.
"3 Compare 15 U.S.C.
77v (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78a(a) (1976) (§ 26 of the
1934 Act). A number of state courts have exercised section 17(a) jurisdiction and recognized the private remedy. See, Wolfson v. Ubile, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCI-1) ¶ 96,280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Alloys Unlimited v. Racslcr, [197677 Transfer Binder] FED. Six. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 55
App. Div.2d 893, 391 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1977); Unit, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken
Corp., 304 A.2d 320 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Barnes v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
64 Misc. 2d 1068, 332 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct., 1972), modified on other grounds, 42 App.
Div.2d 15, 344 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1973).
'" See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
185 See Hazen, supra note 166, at 688.
"" Id. A section 17(a) ruling that deserves mention is the Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. v. Naftalin, 99 S. Ct. 2077 (1979). The Naftalin Court ruled that
section 17(a) can be utilized where the ultimate injury was suffered by broker-dealers
rather than investors. This at first seems to be a drastic departure from the Court's
earlier concerns of limiting the applicability of statutory remedies to investor protection situations. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft, Inc. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). However, the
Securities Exchange Act also regulates the brokerage industry (e.g., 15 U.S.C. 780
(1976)). There is thus an additional interest to be protected in governmental enforce-
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Second, the recent case of Touche Ross v. Reddington"' can be taken to
indicate that if the issue were put to it today, the Supreme Court very well
might limit severely, if not altogether deny, the implied remedy under section
17(a) of the 1933 Act. The Touche Ross opinion severely cut back on the prior
jurisprudence in the field, declaring that the implication of a private remedy is
purely a question of statutory construction. The Court indicated that there is
a presumption against implying a private remedy unless it affirmatively appeared that Congress intended to create one.'" Since the Court has recognized the lOb-5 remedy, however, the same congressional intent that justifies
relief based on this administrative rule would call equally for recognition of a
right of action under the parent statutory provision that was legislatively
adopted in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.'•
There can be no question that the recent Supreme Court decisions under
the securities laws,'" as well as in other areas,'" demonstrate that private
remedies will not be lightly implied from federal criminal statutes. This
should not he taken, however, as an indication that the Court has placed a
moratorium on implied remedies. The Court in Touche Ross was concerned
with the creation of a wholly new area of liability when viewed in conjunction
with the express and implied remedies that now exist.'" In contrast, the
remedy provided by section I7(a) of the 1933 Act complements those provided by the other antifraud provisions, and, thus, its recognition would be
consistent with the Court's recent teachings.
Nevertheless, section 17(a)'s viability as an alternative to the rule 10b-5
remedy has not been tested yet by a sufficient number of courts or by the
Supreme Court. Although it certainly would be premature at this time to discount. its potential relevance to corporate mismanagement cases, all that safely
can be said now is that it is a factor that should be considered. Section 17(a)
could have a valuable role to play as an implied remedy. Indeed, this potential
was recently realized by the District Court for the Southern District of New
York which noted that "[T]he absence of deceptive conduct does not dispose
of all the securities law claims, because section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is in
many respects broader than section 10(b) of the 1934 Act." " 3

ment suits that is not implicated in private damage actions, See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Recldington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979) (denying the existence of an implied remedy under
section 17(a) of the 1934 Securiies Exchange Act).
99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
`" 99 S. Ct. at 2485-86.
" 9 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
"" See, e.g., Touche Ross v. Reddington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979): Piper V. ChrisCraft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. I (1977).
' 91 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979). See generally
Note, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrack and Curt Apply the
Brakes, 17 B.C. INu. & COMM. L. Rev. 53 (1975).
'" 99 S. Ct. at 2486-88. Similarly, in Cannon the opinion merely showed a refusal to tread into new areas without a sufficient indication of legislative intent or
remedial benefits to be gained from such a venture. 99 S. Ct. at 1960-61, 1967-68.
' 93 Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Stipp. 544, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The court went
on to dismiss the section 17(a) claim for failure to satisfy that section's in connection
with" requirement. Id. at 556.
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Rule 14a-9'x' 4 and Section 14(a) 1115 Of the
Exchange Act: The Role of the Proxy Rules
in Regulating Mismanagement

B.

In comparison with the uncertain role of section 17(a), the implied private remedy under the antifraud provisions that cover the federal regulation
of the proxy machinery already have an identifiable, significant impact upon
corporate conduct."" Section 14(a), and, hence, any private remedy thereunder, is limited in scope to issuers whose securities are subject to the Exchange Act's periodic reporting requirements.'" This limitation is in contrast
to the more general antifraud provisions contained in section 17(a) of the
1933 Act, rule 10b-5 and section 14(e), of the Exchange Act,"" which all
17 C.F.R, § 240.14a-9 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
19 " Rule 14a-9 provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in
the light. of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any
earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the
same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting
material has been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be
deemed a finding by the Commission that such material is accurate or
complete or not false or misleading, or that the Commission has passed
upon the merits of or approved any statement contained therein or any
matter to be acted upon by security holders. No representation contrary to
the foregoing shall be made.
NOTE: The following are some examples of what depending upon
particular facts and circumstances may be misleading- within the meaning
of this section.
(a) Predictions as to specific future market values or dividends.
(14 Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity,
or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning
improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations. without factual foundation,
(c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy and other
soliciting material as to clearly distinguish it from the soliciting material of
any other person or persons soliciting for the same meeting or subject matter.
(d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a solicita'" 4

195

LIOH.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979).
It is now beyond question that an implied private remedy exists under rule 14a-9.
See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); j.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See
generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (2d ed.
1968); 2 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 931-1019 (2d ed. 1961).
197 See note 88 supra.
191 Section 14(e) applies 10b-5 type proscriptions to communications sent in
connection with a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). See text accompanying notes 222-43

infra.
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apply to any issuer whose securities are traded through instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.'" This narrower scope of section 14(a) limits its efficacy as a replacement for rule 10b-5 and underscores the danger in overly
limiting the rule 10b-5 private remedy. On the other hand, it will be demonstrated that section 14(a) is not subject to some of the limitations that
recently have been imposed on rule 106-5. Accordingly, section 14(a) can
serve as a complement to rule 10b-5 actions to preserve a role for federal
intervention in the area of corporate mismanagement that avoids the scylla of
federal abdication and the charibdis of creating an unwarranted federal corporate law.
In their regulation of shareholder suffrage, federal proxy rules come into
close contact with the corporate chartering function. 2 " It follows that the
state/federal tensions that concerned the Supreme Court in Santa Fe are most
sensitive when dealing with the implied private remedy under rule I4a-9. Because of its concern with shareholder democracy and the investors' right to
full information when voting their shares, a rule 14a-9 action is not. subject to
the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser/seller standing limitation.'" Similarly, there
have been both pre 202 and post 213 Hoeltfelder decisions that have upheld a
negligence standard in a rule 14a-9 action, notwithstanding the more stringent scienter requirement of rule 10b-5. Finally as is the case with section
1 7(a) of the 1933 Act, there is no statutory requirement that the conduct at
Hence, at least with its most
issue be either "manipulative" or "deceptive.
literal reading Santa Fe, as well as Hoehfelder, has no applicability to rule 14a-9
actions, 205 and although the Supreme Court's concerns regarding federal/state
tensions necessarily spill over to the proxy rules, the utility of the I4a-9 remedy for corporate mismanagement should not be undercut, especially in view
of the weakening of the rule 10b-5 cause of action.
It is important to bear in mind that the areas covered by the proxy rules
are limited. In addition to applying only to Exchange Act reporting issuers : 2 "
section 14(a) necessarily applies only to the types of questions that are brought
to the shareholder for a vote. Corporate statutes all contain a mandate to the
204

"

1" See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 857-58, 872-75

(4th ed. 1977).

2" See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHoRN, supra note 196; Armstrong, Regulation of Proxy Contests by the SEC, 42 VA. L. REV. 1975 (1956); Emerson & Latcham, The
SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1952); Hazen,
Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility
and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391; Schwartz, The Public. Interest Proxy
Context.- Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971); Schwartz & Weiss.
An Assessment tf the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. 1..1. 635 (1977).
" 1 See authorities cited in note 196 .supra.
" 2 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
2 °3 Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 76! (3d Cir. 1976).
2" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976),
2" Id. See note 88 supra. The same can be said of section I4(e)'s tender offer
proscriptions which are discussed in the text at notes 222-43 infra. See note 228 infra.
0 " See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
2
2
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effect that the business of the corporation is managed by the board of directors. 2 ° 7 This mandate excludes a large number of mismanagement cases
from the rule 14a-9 remedy. Though these limitations on rule I4a-9 illustrate
the need for preserving the effectiveness of rule 10b-5, there are several important areas of corporate mismangement that properly can be redressed by
the proxy rules. The following discussion illustrates the different areas in
which the proxy rules have a valuable role to play.
Most of the important proxy cases have arisen within the context of organic corporate changes, such as merger or consolidation, which require a
shareholder vote.' Since such corporate reorganizations generally provide
for an exchange or other disposition of the stockholders' shares, rule 10b-5's
proscriptions also will apply to the reorganization. It is quite common, therefore, for injured shareholders to seek relief under both rules.'" Since the
rule 14a-9 remedy has different standing and fault requirements, this implied
remedy may give relief where a rule 10b-5 claim may fail. Also, since mergers
and other organic corporate changes frequently involve statutory appraisal
rights for dissenting shareholders, 210 the actions will bring the Santa Fe state
law issue into sharp focus. Specifically, the federal/state tension which underlies much of the Santa Fe holding attaches to any proxy related claim in which
the minority does not receive its fair share. In contrast to Santa Fe, however,
the proxy related issue should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff due to the
absence in section 14(a) of a requirement of "manipulative" or "deceptive"
conduct.
Beyond the merger context, the proxy machinery can be important in
another area of organic corporate changes—the issuance of additional shares.
In order to issue stock, such shares must be authorized by the sharehold-

" ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35.
" See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Not-away, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Nills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
F.2d 374 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, note 196 supra.
It is universal that shareholders have the right to vote in such transactions. See,
e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 73, 79, 84; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (Cum.
Supp. 1978) (requiring a majority vote); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1978-79) (requiring a two-thirds majority for approval). Cf. ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 75 (the "short form" merger provision, providing that no shareholder vote is necessary when merging on a ninety percent owned subsidiary into its
parent corporation; Delaware's counterpart to this provision was at issue in Santa Fe).
21111
See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374 (1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975). The complimentary effect of these provisions has been recognized by the Supreme Court:
[T]he existence or nonexistence of regulation under § 14 would not affect
the scope of § 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5. The two sections of the Act apply to
different sets of situations. Section 10(b) applies to all proscribed conduct
in connection with a purchase or sale of any security; § 14 applies to all
proxy solicitations [involving Exchange Act reporting companies], whether
or not in connection with a purchase or sale. The fact that there may well be
some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S 453, 468 (1969) (emphasis supplied).
21 " ABA-AL/ MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 81.
2
2
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ers; 2" only after this authorization does control over the issuance of the
stock rest in the hands of the directors. 212 In many instances, in order to
give the directors a freer hand in managing the business affairs, corporations
have adopted a policy of retaining a substantial reserve of authorized but unissued shares. When this is not the case, however, rule 14a-9 may come into
play if the directors attempt to raise corporate capital by increasing equity
ownership.
The next area in which the proxy rules' antifraud remedy has a valuable
role to play is with respect to the election of directors. This area clearly illustrates the thesis that private remedies under the federal securities laws are not
appropriate in every instance of corporate misconduct, but only in instances
where that misconduct is the result of deception in regard to required disclosure. In its recent decision in Maldonado v. Flynn, 213 the Second Circuit recognized a rule 14a-9 mismanagement claim for management's failure to disclose
past misconduct by the directors standing for reelection."' Significantly, the
misconduct creating the basis for the proxy rule claim in itself did not give
rise to either a rule 10b-5 or a rule 14a-9 claim at the time of the occurrence. 215 The effect of this reasoning on federal corporate mismanagement
litigation should not be underplayed. Since all directors who desire to continue in office must stand for reelection by the shareholders, all past acts of
mismanagement or, perhaps more broadly, those acts that are merely questionable would be subject to required disclosure, provided they met the necessary materiality threshold.'" Since the directors' past performance is germane to their reelection, materiality would seem to be easy to prove in many
such situations.
The use of director elections as the basis for federal mismanagement
claims is an especially timely issue in light of the SEC's new corporate governance rules that compel disclosure of specific information relating to the directors' past conduct in office. 2 " The command for affirmative disclosure resolves any doubt as to materiality of the past conduct, and since a rule 14a-9
remedy does not have the stringent but-for causation requirement 2 t 8 con-

211 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15. In contrast to equity securities, such
shareholder action is not required to issue bonds or other debt instruments.
212 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 16, 18, 19.
212 '597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). See text at notes 145-51 supra.
2 " Id. at 796-98.
215 Id. at 795.
2" See text at notes 153-165 supra.
2 ' 7 See, e.g.. Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-5949 (July 28, 1978); Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No.
34-14970 (July 17, 1978). For example, it is now required that the proxy materials
contain disclosure of director committee membership and attendance. See Schedule
14A Item 6(d) 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 24,037.
218 It is no defense that the defendant controlled sufficient votes to assure the
success of the proposal in question; the key is the integrity of the voting process. See,
e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1970); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 382-84 (2d C:ir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975);
Evmar Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
l 96,358 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
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tained in rule 10b-5, rule 14a-9 should become an extremely important
weapon against. mismanagement that may be utilized more frequently due to
the restrictions on the rule 106-5 remedy. 2 "
In light of the existence of rule 14a-9's more expansive standing 2 " and
causation 22 requirements, coupled with the no-scienter trend, the proxy
rule's implied remedy may prove most significant in permitting federal corporate mismanagement claims to survive Santa Fe. As was pointed out at the
outset of this section, however, since the proxy regulation has a larger overlap
with corporate management norms than does rule 10 5, the potential for
conflict between the proxy regulations and state corporate norms is even
greater. Accordingly, in dealing with the proxy rules, the courts should be
especially viligant to look for investor protection issues, and not t.o utilize rule
14a-9 as a back-door to creating a body of federal corporate law. Actions
-

In order to be actionable the violation must result in injury connected directly to
the proxy system for a 14a-9 action or in connection with a purchase or sale in a 10b-5
action. That is, collateral breaches of fiduciaries will not suffice. See Cramer v. Gen'l
Tel. Elec. Co., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1948 (1979):
Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977),
(insufficient connection); St:Mick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (sufficient connection); In re Tenneco Securities Litigation. 449 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (insufficient connection); Supt of
Ins. v. Freedman, 443 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (insufficient connection); Herman
v. Beretta. [1978 Transfer Binder] Fro. SEC. I... REP. (CC 1 - i) 96,574 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
10, 1978) (same). See text at note 101 supra.
51 " Section I 3(h)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1976,
Supp. 1979), poses similar disclosure problems. See generally ABA Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAw. 307 (1978). See also Akeson, Bialkin,
Chenok, Ferrara, Pitt, Richard & Stevenson, Foreign Corrupt Practices of 1977 and The
Regulation of Questionable Payments, 34 Bus. L. 623 (1979). Section 1304(2), which is not.
limited to foreign involvement, requires accurate accounting of corporate assets and
their disposition as well as the imposition of internal controls to assure that management's policies are being carried out. Even though the question of an implied 13(b)(2)
remedy is at best a speculative one, particularly in light of Touche Ross, (see Akeson et
al. supra, at 639), disclosure may be required through the proxy machinery as well as
by any periodic reports required by the Act. While any 10b-5 claim based upon related
misstatements in an annual report would require a causally related purchase or sale,
misstatements of 13(6)(2) issues in the proxy process make 14a-9's mismanagement
remedy even more meaningful. Sec text at notes 264-68 infra.
One final aspect of the proxy process that deserves mention is the treatment of
shareholder proposals. Rule 14a-8, while purporting to defer to state law on the issue
of what constitutes a proper shareholder matter, gives specific guides for management's treatment of shareholder sponsored resolutions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1979).
Although there has been no recognition of a private remedy under the shareholder
proposal rules, the potential rule 14a-8 cause of action has a role to play. In deciding
whether to omit a shareholder proposal from the proxy materials, there is the question
whether such omission would be material under the antifraud rules. Secondly, when
management. does include such a proposal and states its opposition, the reasons advanced therefore are subject to rule 14a-9 scrutiny. Once again, the interplay between
the implied federal remedy and internal corporate governance becomes evident.
22 " Sec text at note 201 supra. Any shareholder who has a right to participate in
the proxy process is a potential plaintiff.
221 See note 218 supra. and accompanying text.
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under rule I4a-9, therefore, should be used to prevent undue restriction of
the federal securities law's private remedies, but such action should be limited
so as not to infringe on the states' regulation of corporate activity.

C. Section 14(e): 222 The Antifraud Proscriptions
in the Tender Offer Area
Section I4(e) essentially prescribes rule 10b-5 penalties for fraud in required disclosure in the tender offer area. Like sections 17(a) and 14(a), section I4(e) may not be subject to the recent limitations imposed on the rule
10b-5 remedy. Accordingly, section 14(e), to some extent, also can be used to
fill the gap created by these limitations. On the other hand, section 14(e)'s
viability as an alternative to rule 10b-5 is limited by virtue of its applicability
only in the tender offer area. The following section will explore the issues
raised by section 14(e) and evaluate its potential to compensate for the restrictions placed on rule 10b-5.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, m e. 223 the Supreme Court ruled that section 14(e) does not provide a cause of action in the hands of a defeated competing tender offeror. 224 Although the Court did not decide the issue, its
opinion holds out much hope for the recognition of a section 14(e) claim in
the hands of the shareholders of the target company. The essence of the
Court's rationale was that the securities laws' purpose was to further investor
protection and that the target company shareholders, not the plaintiff competing tender offeror were within the ambit of the intended protection. 225 With
the desirable recognition of such a claim 225 there are definite ramifications

222
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to slate any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading. or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.

223 430 U.S. 1 ( 197 7 ).
224

Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 31-34. The court held that recognized principles of implying federal
rights of action did not warrant the remedy sought by the Piper plaintiff. Id. at 33. See
221

generally, Hazen, Corporate Chartering and The Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391; Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34
Bus. LAW. 117 (1978).
225
See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger International, Inc., [current.]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 96,877 (2d Cir. May 18, 1979) (recognizing the 14(e) remedy but. finding no substantive violation). See also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 419 U.S. 873 (1974); H.K. Potter Co. v. Nicholson
File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Con-.
trols Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Crane v. American Standards, Inc., 439 F.
Stipp. 945 (S.O.N.Y. 1977). See generally Pitt„orpra note 207. at 129-33, 186-91.
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with regard to the regulation of corporate mismanagement. In the first. instance, since section 14(e) requires the claim to arise in connection with tender
offers, in contrast to rule 10b-5's concern for purchases and sales of securities,
the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser/seller limitation would not apply. Instead, a
section 14(e) claim is based on whether the plaintiff was the target of a tender
offer solicitation or was in opposition to a tender offer. 227
Similarly, as is the case with both section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and rule
14a-9, the language of section 14(e) arguably could cover merely negligent
conduct, even in light of Hochfelder's rule 10b-5 scienter requirement. 228 While
courts have applied a negligence standard under both section 17(a) 2211 and
rule I4a-9, 23 ° this does not. appear to be happening with section 14(e). 23 ' Unlike sections 17(a) and 14(a), section 14(e) contains the "manipulative and deceptive" language 232 that the Hochfelder court felt mandated a scienter requirement for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder. It is
likely, therefore, that a scienter standard should apply to section 14(e). For
similar reasons the deception requirement also should apply here. In fact,
there has been at. least one court that has applied the Santa Fe deception
requirement to a section 14(e) private damage claim. 233 Nevertheless, despite
these potential limits, there are a number of areas in which section 14(e) has a
valid role to play.
During the course of a takeover attempt there are a number of ways in
which the directors of the target company can be implicated for mismanagement in such a manner as to give the target's shareholders a potential section
14(e) claim. In the first instance there is the situation where a take-over attempt, to which existing management is friendly, comes in the form of a tender offer. 234 In such a case. as with management supported mergers and the
227

See authorities cited in note 208 supra.
22" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Supreme Court based its decision in Hochfelder at least partially upon the manipulative and deceptive acts or practices limitation of
section 10(b) which necessarily applies to 10b-5, including I Ob-5(2)'s prohibition
against misrepresentations or omissions, which standing alone would seem to permit a
negligence standard. See text and notes at notes 158-61, 178-82, 202-03 ,supra. While
neither section I7(a) of the 1933 Act. section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, nor
rule I4a-9 contain this language, section 14(e) does. However, section 14(e) literally
precludes both omissions and misrepresentations as well as "fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1978). Thus, the tender offer provision can he read in the alternative, in contrast to section 10(bis pervasive requirement. This hears not only upon Hochfelder's application, but also on Santa Fe's deception requirement. See generally R. JEN:Nis:6s & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES & MATERIALS 997 (4th ed. 1977).
229
See notes 178-82 supra and accompanying text.
23" See notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text.
231 See in re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Securities Litigation,
467 F. Supp. 227, 245 (W.D. Tex 1979).
232 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
233 Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See note 228 supra. See
also In re Sunshine Mining Co. Securities Litigation, 509 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
A-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1979), where the court applied the deception requirement in a
section 14(c) case.
234 Although once disputed, it is now clear that a takeover attempt need not be
hostile in order to qualify as a "tender offer within the act's nebulous definition. See
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proxy rules involved therein 235 any statements in support of the offer will
come under section 14(e) scrutiny and will give rise to an appropriate private
remedy. Since tender offers necessarily arise in connection with a transfer of
corporate contro1, 23 ' the potential management abuses and opportunities for
self-dealing are rampant. 237 When put within the disclosure context of section 14(e), such potential abuses accompanying transfers of control include
direct as well as indirect premiums to the incumbent management; these
premiums may, for example, take the form of long-term employment and
consultation contracts. Any materiality standard under section 14(e) would
seem to require that such arrangements he fully disclosed and explained to
the target's shareholders. Given this affirmative duty of disclosure, the concomitant liability for misstatements and omissions necessarily follows. These
and other control related abuses"' present the same desirable complementary
relationship between the relevant state law of fiduciary duties and section 14(e)
that the Second Circuit found to exist with respect to rule 101)-5 in its decision
in Goldberg v. Meridor. 23 " In these instances, misconduct alone does not give
rise to a federal private remedy, but the failure to disclose such misconduct at
the appropriate time does.
Section 14(e) also has a valuable role to play in the case of the hostile
takeover attempt by an outsider where there is an equally great potential for
internal mismanagement. In such a case the target company's management is
in a conflict-of-interest situation; they stand to lose their jobs if the tender
offer is successful. As is the case with rule lob-5, the conflict-of-interest issue
raises its own disclosure problems."° Over time an increasing number of
defensive takeover tactics have developed, all of which involve potential claims
of mismanagement."' It is desirable that section 14(e) be available to the
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974). See generally R. JE:NNiNGs & H. MARSH, supra note 228; Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV,
L. REv. 1250 (1973).
235 See Section III-B supra.
236 In fact in defining the term "tender offer" the courts require a shift. in
control. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co.. 336 F. Stipp. 890, 907 (N.D.
Me. 1971).
237 See, e.g., Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
628 (1965); Hazen, Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling
Shareholders—Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies ' - and a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1977): Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF.
L. REv. 1 (1956); O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller
Liability, 38 U. PITT. L. REv. 9 (1976).
238 See authorities cited in note 237 supra.
239 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See text at
notes 90-99 supra.
240 See, Klink, Management's Role in Recommending for or Against an Offer, 25 Bus.
LAW. 845 (1970). See text at notes 28-36, 77-103 supra.
241
See generally, A. FLEISCHER, THE FENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND
PLANNING (1978); Fleischer, Defensive Tacticism Tender Offers, 9 SEC. REG. L. REv. 853
(1976); McIntyre, Shareholders' Recourse Under the Federal Securities Laws Against Management for Opposing Advantageous Tender Offers, 34 Bus. LAW. 1283 (1979). R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, supra note 228 at 744-48; Cary. Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management
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target company's shareholders to require management to disclose these conflicts of interest, lest it suffer the resulting liability for failure to do so.
It is easy to see how defensive tactics can give rise to disclosure related
section I4(e) questions. For example, how specific must the target company's
management be about its reasons for opposing the takeover? Al. what point
does the opposition overstep the bounds of the business judgment rule and
involve a waste of corporate assets? Are there any collateral activities that. the
target. management engages in primarily to thwart the takeover? And, at what.
point need defensive merger negotiations be disclosed? The answers to all of
these questions are relevant to the target company's shareholders in deciding
whether to tender their shares. Accordingly, each of these illustrative questions gives rise to section I4(e) issues.
Section 14(e), like the other federal antifraud remedies discussed above, is
not necessarily subject to some of the limitations imposed on rule 10b-5, especially those within the sphere of internal corporate management. Both the
tender offer movement. and the corresponding federal regulation are relatively recent, however, and have resulted in few cases and thus give little guidance for the future. It. is clear, though, that in refining the section 14(e)
remedy, especially in the mismanagement sphere, the courts must be mindful
of the Santa Fe Court's concern for state/federal tensions,"' a concern which
also is emphasized by the Court's opinion in Piper.'ai It is the author's view
that this difficult line should be drawn in the following manner. Those abuses
that do not impinge directly upon investor protection and the orderly functioning of the securities markets should be left to the states. Such matters are
issues of ordinary corporate mismanagement. Those abuses which rise above
that threshold should be subject to the disclosure deception rule and, accordingly, liability under the federal securities laws is appropriate.

From Attack, 25 Bus. LAW. 839 (1970); Kennedy, Defensive Take-Over Procedures Since the

Williams Act, 19 CATtioLic U. L, REV. 158 (1969). The long history of events that
formed the basis of the Piper suit gives an example of the use of those tactics. See
Chris-Craft. Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2c1 Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430
U.S. 1 (1977).
242
An interesting twist on these tensions has arisen in the tender offer regulation arena as the states have enacted their own legislation limiting tender offers. This
legislation may well conflict with the Williams Act. Moreover, these laws have been
challenged as unconstitutional under the commerce clause and alleged to have been
preempted by the Williams Act. The Fifth Circuit held the Idaho statute unconstitutional and the Supreme Court, while foregoing continent on the merits, reversed on
venue grounds. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1494 (1979). See generally Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FoRDHAm L. REv.
(1976); Report, State Takeover Statutes and The Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 187 (1976).
243 See text at notes 223-28 supra. This concern, however, particularly in light of
Touche Ross, could lead the court to deny the existence of any implied private remedy
under § 14(e), even to shareholders of the target company.
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D. Section 18(a) of the Exchange Act and
its Relevance to Implied Remedies
In addition to the rule 101)-5 ramifications of requiring affirmative disclosure in the 10k '-44 and annual reports, section 18(a) of the Exchange Act 245
provides an express remedy to the investor who purchases or sells a security
in reliance upon misinformation contained in any document that is required
to be filed with the SEC. Section I8(a) is narrower than the rule 10b-5 action
in that it. has an "eyeball - requirement. This requirement provides that the
plaintiff trading on the information must see the filed document, and not.
merely the same information gathered somewhere else, such as in the annual
report.' Section 18(a) does not expressly impose scienter but shifts the
burden to the defendant to prove good faith and lack of knowledge."' Accordingly, the express remedy provided by section I8(a) sometimes can be
used to circumvent the Hochfelder limitation imposed on rule 10b-5. On the
other hand, not all rule 101)-5 plaintiffs will be able to use section 18(a) because of the "eyeball" requirement. This difficulty would be partially ameliorated if section 18(a) were found not to be an exclusive remedy. Although one
district court has found the section 18(a) remedy to he exclusive,' the better
view is that it is not, and, thus, that all federal remedies are cumulative."
While, in light of Touche Ross, the existence of section I8(a) may lead some
courts incorrectly to deny the existence of an implied remedy under section

244

4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 4,] 31,101. Form 10K is the document by which

reporting companies satisfy the disclosure requirements of Sections 13 and 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1976). For what constitutes a reporting company, see footnote 88 supra.
=" 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976):
Any person who shall make or cause to he made any statement in any
application, report, or document. filed pursuant to this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration
statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this title, which
statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or
sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement., for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit. the court
may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the Costs
of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees, against either party litigant.
21 See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1968): Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Stipp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1977):
Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors. [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1196,170 (S.D.N.Y. September 14, 1977).
247 IS U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
24R Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 491 Sec. REG. L. REP. (BNA) A-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
8, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
2

" See authorities cited in note 246

supra.
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17(a) or 14(e), at least with regard to rule 10b-5 and rule 14(a) actions the
section 18(a) remedy should not be exclusive. Section 18(a) was developed
expressly to provide a remedy for a certain wrong. It should not be used to
cut off other avenues of redress that potential plaintiffs might have or to
force them to forego use of section 18(a). In keeping with this interpretation,
the Second Circuit recently has adopted the position that section 18(a) can
and does co-exist with implied remedies under rule 10b-5. 25 °
The presence of section 18(a), combined with the implied remedies discussed earlier, underscores the rightful place of disclosure as the touchstone
for applying remedies under the federal securities laws. To the extent that
disclosure requirements continue to creep into internal governance matters,
the viability of the antifraud provisions as weapons against corporate mismanagement will remain potent. These remedies have the potential to do much to
combat fraud in the area of corporate mismanagement. As such, they may
fulfill an important role in filling the void left by the restrictions on rule
I0b-5, and may afford meaningful remedies for wronged investors while at
the same time supplementing rather than invading the province of the state
chartering law.
IV. THE SEC: DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT
The discussion thus far has been limited to private remedies under the
securities laws which redress mismanagement, and thereby affect. corporate
governance. The role that the SEC plays in enforcing the various disclosure
provisions is also relevant to understanding and evaluating the role that the
federal securities laws do and should play in remedying corporate mismanagement. The SEC claims that its enforcement actions are not subject to the
limitations that have been placed recently on private actions under rule 10b-5
and under other sections of the securities laws that may serve as alternatives
to rule 1 Oh-5. This section will examine some key recent developments 251 that
illustrate the extent of the SEC's intrusion into the field of corporate governance. It will be shown that the SEC should be limited, and generally is limited to enforcing corporate responsibility only where there has been deception
in connection with a required disclosure. On the other hand, the SEC has and
should have a slightly freer hand than the private litigant, since there is less
potential for exacerbating federal/state tensions in enforcement actions.

"" Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
25 ' For an in depth treatment of the philosophy behind this type of SEC . involvement, see, e.g., Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARV.
REV. 396 (1936); Fleisher, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV.
1 146 (1965); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 1111cm. L. REV. 607
(1964); Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 565 (1972).
-
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It is clear that the SEC is not subject to some of the limitations on private
litigants discussed earlier. As the civil enforcer of the antifraud provisions the
Commission is held to a lower standard of proof in litigation than is a private
party seeking damages. The SEC is not subject to any of the standing restrictions, such as the purchaser/seller limitation of Blue Chip Stamps.252 In addition, most courts have held that the scienter requirement does not apply to
the SEC. 253 The Commission also does not feel that it is affected by the
deception requirement of Santa Fe. This stance is an issue worth exploring,
since it is far from clear that the SEC is correct in its position regarding the
scope of Santa Fe.
Prior to the Santa Fe decision the SEC promulgated a series of going
private rules which, inter alia, would have given the Commission the power to
halt such transactions on the basis of fairness to the shareholders. 254 One
might think that Santa Fe quite explicitly held that there is no remedy under
the federal securities laws for unfair transactions and breaches of fiduciary
duty without some deception in disclosure. 255 Nevertheless, the Commission
continues to maintain that it has the power to regulate the fairness of such
transactions. Specifically, in 1977 the Commission presented its post-Santa Fe
proposed going private rules and noted that the fairness requirements can be
and were contained in the new version. 256 However, when the new going
private rules were adopted, the Commission deleted the fairness requirement noting it "believes that the question of regulation should be deferred until there
is an opportunity to determine the efficacy of [the rules as adopted]." 257
Although the Commission has postponed enforcement of its fairness standard, it is clear that the SEC continues to interpret the scope of its authority as encompassing the enforcement of a fairness standard. It is unclear
whether the SEC is right or wrong in this interpretation. While the Santa Fe
requirement was based on a statutory interpretation that section 10(b) is
limited to abuses that are deceptive, not just unfair, 258 the going private rules
are not promulgated under section I 0(b), but rather under section 13(e). 2 "
Although Santa Fe may be extended to this section as well, it has not been so
extended to date. In considering this issue, however, the SEC should note that
it has not been chartered to create a federal body of corporate law, and thus
should proceed cautiously if at all.

The SEC cannot he a purchaser or seller of securities.
See text- and notes at notes 162-63 supra.
2 " Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-5567 (Feb. 6, 1975). See generally Note, "Going Private";
Establishing Federal Standards for the Forced Elimination of Public Investors, 1975 U. ILL. L.
F. 638; Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and Stale Remedies, 44 FORDHAM L.
REV. 796 (1976); Comment, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of Investors: A
Comment on the Proposed "Going Private" Rules, 51 IND. L. REV. 433 (1976).
255 430 U.S. at 474-77.
2 " Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-5884, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977).
2 " Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-6100, 515 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1 (Aug. 2,
1979).
" 8 430 U.S. at 473-74.
25" See Note, An Appraisal of Authority for the Fairness Standard Contained in the
SEC's Proposed "Going Private" Regulations, 28 EMORY L.J. 111 (1979).
232

253
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The Commission's aggressive attitude indicates that it will not he easily
eliminated from the area of corporate governance. The most recent amendments to the proxy rules relating to directors' activities and relationships
further illustrate this reality.'" These rules include disclosure guidelines relating to the composition of such important directors' delegations of authority
as compensation and audit committees.'" The SEC stands on firmer ground
in the proxy area since it is merely enforcing and refining the concept. of full
disclosure. Since directors' decisions with regard to compensation and audit
committees are materially relevant to shareholders decisions with regard to
their reelection by proxy, the SEC is not overstepping its mandate here. It is
requiring that management disclose practices of which it disapproves, not that.
these practices be changed. The rules thus focus on disclosure, rather than on
mandating conduct. The disclosure requirements, however, may, in turn,
coerce substantive changes in corporate conduct and organizational structure.
An example is found with regard to independent audit committees, which the
SEC generally views favorably."' Specifically, the Com mission's General
Counsel has taken the position that it has the power to require such committees for all Exchange Act reporting companies by administrative rule. 2 " 3 Vet,
to date, this asserted power has not been exercised, even though calling for
disclosure of the non-existence of an audit. committee might have the same
effect. This type of encroachment upon internal corporate structure poses the
same threat to state/federal relationships as does an unbridled expansion of
the private remedies for mismanagement discussed earlier. Accordingly, the
Commission should proceed cautiously in this area, and should rely on disclosure rather than on mandating actual changes in corporate structure.
The most critical recent commission activity emerges in its proposed rules
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act Amendments to the 1934 Exchange
Act. Specifically, section 13(b) as amended imposes two new requirements on
reporting companies: one, more accurate disclosure of corporate expenditures, and two, the institution of internal controls to assure compliance with
management policies.'" These new statutory sections, in conjunction with
the commission's proposed rules thereunder,2 "' will have a significant impact.

2

"" See note 217 supra.

2 "'

Sec, Act Rel. No. 33-5949 (July 28, 1978); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-14970
(July 17, 1978).
212 All issuers with New York Stock Exchange listed securities are required nr
have such committees. Sec. Exch. Act Rel, No. 34-13346 (March 9, 1977). See Greene
Falk. The Audit Committee—A Measured Contribution to Corporate Governance: A Realistic
Appraisal of its Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus, LAw. 1229.( 1 979).
2 " Memorandum of General Counsel Harvey L. Pitt to Chairman Williams,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) ¶ 81,535 (March 2, 1978). Within the
context of enforcement actions the SEC has in some cases required independent audit
committees in its consent decrees. See, e.g., Woods Corp., Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 3415337 (Nov. 16, 1978); Hycel, Inc.. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-14981 (July 20. 1978):
but see, SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer- Binder] FED, SEG. L. REP.
(CCH) 1196,583 (D.D.C. 1978). See Block & Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty after Santa Fe v. Green, 2 CoRP. L. REv. 81 (1979).
244 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1978). Sec note 219 supra.
2"5 Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-15772 (April 30, 1979).
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upon corporate internal structure and governance. Under these proposed
rules, in the first year following their effective date, the Form 10-K that is
filed with the. SEC, 2 " the issuer's annual report, and the proxy materials
would all contain:
I. Management's opinion as to whether, as of the date of such audited balance sheet, the systems of internal accounting control of the
registrant and its subsidiaries provided reasonable assurances that.
specified objectives of internal accounting control were achieved; and
2. A description of any material weaknesses in internal accounting
control communicated by the independent accountants of the registrant. or its subsidiaries which have not been corrected, and a statement of the reasons why they have not been corrected. 2 '' 7
In subsequent years these opinions would include certifications as to the efficacy of such controls during the previous year:
the statement of management on internal accounting control would
be required to include management's opinion as to whether, for such
periods, the systems of internal accounting control of the registrant
and its subsidiaries provided reasonable assurances that the specified
objectives of internal accounting control were achieved. In addition,
the statement. of management on internal accounting control would
be required to be examined and reported on by an independent
public accountant for such periods. 2 " 8
These proposed rules and their parent statutory section 13(b) are an example
of a salutary effort by the SEC to improve corporate responsibility without
creating a federal corporate law. On their face, they merely require disclosure
and do not insist that the reporting companies change their practices.
Nevertheless, many companies will have to do so unless they want to disclose
the weaknesses of their internal accounting controls. These rules, therefore,
should have a niarked impact on corporate governance where charges are
made against management, and in the litigation arena where the failure to
make internal rule changes is not properly disclosed. Since the proposed SEC
rules require proxy related disclosure, liability for omissions and misstatements under rule 14a-9 will be enhanced.'" The SEC's role in enforcing the
corporate disclosure provisions, therefore, must not, he discounted, but it.
should be limited to areas where there is deception with regard to disclosure.
V. FEDERAL. REMEDIES FOR CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT
UNDER THE PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE

Last year the American Law Institute gave its official imprimatur to the
final version of the Proposed Federal Securities Code that had been drafted

' 4 Fen. SEC. L. REP.(CCI-1) 1; 31,101.
" 7 Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 31-15772 (April 30, 1979).

21

2.1iN
2

Co Lu

" See Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79
L. REv. 1085 (1979).
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over a ten-year period. 270 Although the SEC has not taken an official position regarding the Proposed Code, it is expected that the legislation will be
introduced in Congress before long. It is thus desirable to examine what effects the Code would have on the present federal securities laws' remedy for
corporate mismanagement, and whether those effects will be helpful. Unfortunately, an examination of the Code's relevant provisions makes it clear that
the questions with regard to corporate mismanagement raised under current
law would remain unanswered should the proposed statute be adopted. If
anything, the Code would compound the problem by still allowing for implied
remedies, while also giving express private rights of action for the counterparts to the current implied liability discussed earlier. 271
In its definition section the Code makes it explicit that "[t]he existence of
a fraudulent act is not precluded by the fact that it constitutes company mismanagement." 272 This general statement indicates that the Code will not retreat from the recent trends toward a greater federal role in corporate governance. On the other hand, the express adoption of a scienter requirement
when dealing with "fraudulent acts" 273 continues much of the Hochfelder limitations presently existing. The general antifraud provision of section 1602(a),
however, would prohibit fraudulent acts or misrepresentations:
[Purchases, sales, proxy solicitations, tender offers, and investment advice.]
(a) [General.] It is unlawful For any person to engage in a fraudulent
act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or
purchase of a security, an offer to buy or sell a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security, (2) a proxy solicitation or
other circularization of security holders in respect of a security of a
registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security holders in favor of or opposition to a tender offer, or (4) activity or
proposed activity as an investment adviser. 274
The reporter's comments suggest that the section's language permits the SEC
to employ a negligence standard in its enforcement actions, but that the express private remedies all provide for at least a semblance of a scienter requirement. 2 " If that it is true, the Code in this respect constitutes a continuation of the current trend of the cases.
Section 1703 of the Proposed Code provides an express remedy for the
purchasers and sellers who are injured by violations of section 1602(a). 2 " Sec279 A1,1 PROPOSED FEDERAL SEcuRrrtEs CODE ( 1979) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CODE].
271 Compare PROPOSED CODE §§ 1703, 1713 with PROPOSED CODE § 1722.
272 PROPOSED CODE § 262(e). This fails to answer the question of where the
Santa Fe line is to be drawn.
223 Id. § 262(c): "a person engages in a fraudulent act. only if he acts with
knowledge that his conduct is of a type specified in that section, or in reckless disregard of whether that is so."
274 Id. §, 1602(a).
275 Id. comment 3: "The several private actions based on misrepresentation
either require the plaintiff to prove scienter or afford various defenses going essentially to its absence." See, e.g., id. §§ 1703(f), 1704(f), and 1713. But see id. 1722, discussed in text at notes 283-86 infra.
226 Id. § 1703(a) and (h) applying to transactions made both in and outside of
the trading markets.
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tion 1704 provides a private right analagous to, but broader than, section
18(a) of the Exchange Act."' While the foregoing liability provisions incorporate both the Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder limitations, they do not in the
least bit clarify the ambiguities left open by the Santa Fe decision, 278 at least in
the rule 10b-5 area.
The reason for this omission is perhaps suggested by the following comment. After noting the unresolved state of the cases, which would remain
unaffected by the Code, 279 the reporter, Professor Louis Loss, notes:
The Reporter is inclined to leave the "fairness" concept to
another day—perhaps Professor Cary's federal standards ideas. See
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
Yale L.J. 663 (1974). That is to say, if there is to be federal law with
respect to company-insider transactions that do not descend to the
level of "fraud" or "deception," in principle the choice of federal
versus state law should not depend on the happenstance of a security
transaction
. 28"

277 Id. § 1704, covering misstatements in SEC filings, including annual reports,
registration statements and offering statements.
278 This is reflected in the reporter's comments: Id. § 1603, comments 2(y),
3(a)(vi) and 3(b).
279 Id. comments 3(a)(vi), and (b). This comment provides:
(vi) Nothing in the Code is inconsistent with any of the learning
(though uncodified) of Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971): (A) that "the fact that creditors of the defrauded
corporate buyer or seller of securities may be the ultimate victims does not
warrant disregard of the corporate entity" (404 U.S. at 12); and (13) that
misappropriation of the proceeds of a sale of securities may be a fraudulent act creating liability for the misappropriator if "the seller was duped
into believing that it, the seller, would receive the proceeds" (404 U.S. at
9), even though the sale is for full value and the misappropriator is neither
a buyer nor a seller. Moreover, there can he no doubt that § 1703 covers a
sale of a portfolio security.
(b) On the other hand, the Code is not overruling Santa Fe Industries
(see Comment (2)(y)) by specifically endorsing the reading that a number
of commentators gave Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2cl 215 (2d Cir. en
banc 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906: that
inadequate (some would say "grossly unfair") price coupled with controlling influence establishes a 10b-5 violation regardless of disclosure. See,
e.g., Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. Rev, 1007 (1973). Others (including the Reporter) rationalized that case on the basis of the parent buyer's nondisclosure
of an oil strike to "the corporation" as represented by the stockholders in
the absence of a disinterested majority of directors. The opinion was so
read by a panel of the same court in Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.
1972), where the court assumed that the allegedly unfair exchange ratio
had been fully disclosed to the stockholders in the course of soliciting their
required approval. See also Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Friendly, J.). And the Supreme Court in Santa Fe cited Schoenbaum as a
case that "involved an element of deception as part of the fiduciary misconduct." 97 S. Ct. at 130i, n.15.
1603, comment 3(b).
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Such a notion is commendable. The securities laws should not be used as a
vehicle to create a body of federal corporate law. Until such a federal corporate law is created, remedies under the securities laws should be limited to
cases where investor protection is the primary issue. The proposed code, like
the current law, frames the question in terms of whether there is fraud or
deception.
The new statute also would codify private rights of action for proxy related 2 " and tender offer 282 violations. The new law therefore, would provide
for the same interrelationships that exist today between these areas and the
general antifraud remedy for purchasers and sellers. Similarly, there would be
the same potential for state/federal tensions that exist under the 1933 Act and
the Exchange Act. Again, that tension is desirable in the context of
deception-in-disclosure, but not in the area of corporate misconduct. The
Code would perpetuate the absence of a defined balance, and thus would not
help resolve the issues under discussion herein.
In addition to the express liability provisions, the Code contains an
explicit grant of power for the courts to imply supplemental private remedies:
Sec. 1722 [Degree of exclusivity of part XVII.] (a) [Implied actions.]
A court, considering the nature of the defendant's conduct, the degree of his culpability, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the
deterrent effect of recognizing a private action based on a violation of
a provision of this Code (as defined in section 225), may recognize
such an action even though it is not, expressly created by part XVII,
but only if (I) the action is not inconsistent with the conditions of

281 Id. § 1713(a):
[Proxy solicitations.] On proof in an action by the issuer, or a security holder

who has been or is about to be solicited or circularized within the meaning
of section 603(a), that the defendant has violated, is violating, or is about to
violate section 603, 604, 1602(a)(2), or I602(b)(1)(B), a court may (1) enjoin
a violation or further violation, (2) require compliance, (3) enjoin the use of
proxies solicited or given in violation or the consummation of action authorized by their use, (4) set aside action so consummated, (5) award damages against the violator for any loss caused by his violation, or (6) gram
other appropriate relief (preliminary or final), including a combination of
the types of relief here specified.
"2 Id. § 1713(b):
[Acquisitions and tender offer.] On proof in an action by the issuer of a security that is the subject of a tender offer (or a proposed tender offer) or
whose acquisition requires a filing under section 605(b), a holder of such a
security (or of another security whose interests are adversely affected), a
person who has tendered a security pursuant to a tender offer, or person
who has made or proposes to make a lender oiler, that the defendant has
violated, is violating, or is about to violate section 605(h), 606, 607(d),
1602(a)(1) or (3), 1602(b)(1)(A) or (C), 1603(a), or 1613, a court may (1) enjoin a violation or further violation, (2) require compliance, (3) enjoin the
voting of securities acquired in violation or the consummation of action
authorized by their having been voted, (4) set aside action so consummated,
(5) award damages against the violater for any loss caused by his violation,
or (6) grant other appropriate relief (preliminary or final), including a
combination or the types of relief here specified.
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restrictions in any of the actions expressly created or with the
scheme of the Code, (2) the provision, rule, or order is designed for
the special benefit of a class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs
against the kind of harm alleged, (3) the plaintiff satisfies the court
that under the circumstances the type of remedy sought is not disproportionate to the alleged violation, and (4), in cases comparable
to those dealt. with in section 1702(e)(2) or 1709(c)(2) or a similar
provision that specifies a maximum measure of damages, a comparable maximum is imposed. 2 s'
This provision was drafted with an eye toward preserving the Supreme
Court's current test announced in Cart v. Ash 284 and followed in subsequent
securities law decisions. 2 A5 The Supreme Court's decision in Touche Ross v.
Reddington 28" might be viewed as severely undercutting the validity of the Cart
test, and thus could be taken to indicate that the Court as presently constituted would recognize few if any new implied private remedies."' In that
sense, this section of the Code departs in a desirable direction from one view
of what may be a current. trend. The better view, however, is that. Cort has
survived its recent scrutiny in the Supreme Court.'"
The consistency requirement of subsecton 1 of section 1722, noted above,
places limitations on implied remedies, but does not preclude the recognition
of parallel cumulative remedies that would differ from, yet also complement,
the express rights of action. This would give activist courts an opportunity to
create remedies that are not limited by the standing and scienter requirements, 289 while at the same time placing necessary limits on their ability to do
so. The Code would return the law of implying private remedies to its state
prior to Touche Ross.
The Code's open-endedness on all of the issues discussed herein is not
carelessness, but, rather, represents a belief that the courts are better equipped than Congress to deal with those questions. The courts can give the
needed flexibility over time to cope with realities in the market place. The
present Supreme Court does not agree with this policy. It does not believe in
judicial flexibility, and is unsympathetic to the defrauded litigant, incorrectly
assuming that in almost all cases, if Congress did not provide an express remedy, there should not be one. The Code would redress this imbalance. It
would restore to the federal judiciary its role as a common law court of equity
designed to create flexible rules of law that change with the times and dispense justice.

Id. § 1722.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
285 Proposed Code § 1722, comment 3. See note 66 supra.
2 " 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979). But see PROPOSED CODE § 1603, comment 3(a)(ii).
287 See text accompanying notes 187-92 supra.. The Supreme Court has recently
decided that there is no implied remedy under § 206 of the Investment Adviser's Act.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). But at the same
time, it implied a right or recission under section 215 of the Act, 100 S. Ct. at 245.
283

284

288

289

see id.

See
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VI. CONCLUSION

It is now clear that the majority of circuit and district courts fortunately
do not read the Santa Fe decision as having sounded the death knell for all
federal mismanagement remedies. Rather, what appears to be evolving is a
necessary refinement of the complementary role that the implied federal
rights of action can play with respect to the state regulation of corporate affairs. The Supreme Court's concern over undue state/federal tensions is partially being met by federal and SEC rulings that preclude conflicts between
the state and federal law at issue. This clearly was one result that. was mandated by the Court's proper express refusal to "impose a stricter standard of
fiduciary duty than that required by the law of some states." 2"
By way of example, the two most recent Second Circuit decisions reveal
the ways in which the proper use of the implied federal antifraud remedies
can aid the states on both a prospective and retrospective basis. In Goldberg v.
Meridor, 2 " the court used rule 10b-5 to require advance disclosure of facts
that would give rise to a state law remedy. It properly realized that the federal
securities laws have a role to play if there is any deception in regard to any
disclosure, even if that disclosure is mandated only by state law. In Maldonado
v. FlTnn,292 the court employed rule 14a-9 to require disclosure of past acts
that would affect the reasonable shareholder's decision concerning the reelection of certain directors.'" In both of these cases the federal claim was properly dependent upon, rather than in conflict with, the applicable state law
management norms. Similarly, sections I7(a) of the 1933 Act and section .14(e)
of the Exchange Act also have a role to play in regulating corporate affairs,
provided this is clone consistently with the relevant corporate chartering rules
of the states, rather than in conflict. with them.
In its wave of new disclosure provisions, however, Congress and the
Commission have opened the door to further potential conflict with the appropriate state law. As long as this conflict is the result of federal concern for
full and honest. disclosure and not the result of an attempt to create a backdoor federal corporate law, these conflicts are unavoidable and should be resolved against the states. By following the trend of the Second Circuit, these
provisions can play a necessary and valuable role in preventing corporate
mismanagement while furthering the investor-protection policies of the securities law, and without running afoul of the lessons to be learned from the
Santa Fe ruling.

"" 430 U.S. at 479 n.16.
" 1 567 F.2c1 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See, e.g.,
Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2c1 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978); see text at notes 77-117 supra.
292 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
2"3 Id. at 796. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra.
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